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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I;

The first point of the Appellees' brief is that

"There Are No Genuine Issues As to Appellants7 Cause of Action for
Breach of Contract."

Within Point I are three subpoints.

The

first subpoint is that it is undisputed that the Appellees did not
enter into a contract with the Appellants.

The basis for this

argument

that

is the

simple, undisputed

fact

the

contract

("Agreement and Escrow") that the Appellants claim the Appellees
breached, and the documents incorporated with the "Agreement and
Escrow", were not signed by or for the Appellees.

It is also an

undisputed fact that the parties who did sign these documents were
careful to state

in what capacity

they were

signing.

The

Appellants7 attempt to create a factual dispute by presenting the
Affidavit of Walter Park Larson, which states that Bruno and Gay
(the parties who did sign the written documents) did so as agents
of the Appellees. The parol evidence rule prevents the Appellants
from introducing evidence that would vary or contradict the terms
of the written documents.

As the Affidavit of Walter Park Larson

contradicts and varies the terms of the written documents by
claiming that the Appellees, and not the others, are bound and
obligated by the terms of the contract, by operation of the parol
evidence rule, the Affidavit does not create a factual issue that
the Appellees were parties to the written agreements.
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The

second

subpoint

is

that

it

is

undisputed

that

the

Appellees' contractual obligations, if any, are subject to an
unfulfilled condition precedent. The purchasers under the contract
were purchasing an automobile dealership known as "Larson Ford."
Prior to the signing of the "Agreement and Escrow", Larson Ford had
filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code,

and

had

a

Reorganization.

120-day

exclusive

right

to

file

a

Plan

of

According to the written documents in this case,

(a) the closing date of the "Agreement and Escrow" was to be within
ten (10) days from the date the bankruptcy court confirmed Larson
Ford / s plan of reorganization; and (b) if the bankruptcy court did
not approve Larson's Ford's plan, the purchasers had the right to
rescind the "Agreement and Escrow".
bankruptcy

court

reorganization,

did

it

not

As it is undisputed that the

approve

Larson

is equally undisputed

obligations under the

"Agreement

Ford's

plan

of

that the purchasers'

and Escrow" and

incorporated

documents never arose as they were subject to an unfulfilled
condition precedent.
The third subsection is that pursuant to the Amendment to the
"Agreement and Escrow" it is undisputed that the purchasers had the
right

to

cease

reorganization.

active

pursuit

The Amendment

of

to the

Larson

Ford's

"Agreement

and

plan

of

Escrow"

provides that the purchasers had the absolute right to cease active
3

pursuit of the plan of reorganization of Larson Ford.

Even if

there is a factual dispute as to whether the Appellees were parties
to the contract, summary judgment is still proper as the written
documents allowed the purchasers the right to cease their efforts
to purchase Larson Ford.
POINT II;

The second point of the Appellees'

Brief is

that "There Is No Genuine Dispute That the Appellees Did Not Make
Careless and/or Negligent Misrepresentations." This point contains
four subsections.
The

first

subsection

is

that

the

Appellants'

claim

of

negligent and/or careless misrepresentations is barred by the parol
evidence rule.
are

actually

The misrepresentations claimed by the Appellants
the

contractual

terms

of

the

Addendum

to

the

"Agreement and Escrow". As it is undisputed that the Appellees are
not parties to those documents, it is undisputed that the Appellees
could not have made misrepresentations.
The second subsection is that it is undisputed that negligent
misrepresentations cannot apply in the instant case. For negligent
misrepresentations to apply, there must be a special confidential
relationship. Based upon the Appellants' own discovery answers, it
is undisputed that the transaction in question was an arms-length
transaction.
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The third subsection of Point II is that it is undisputed that
the Appellees did not misrepresent facts to the Appellants.

As

Appellant Walter P. Larson testified in deposition and in his
answers to interrogatories that the alleged misrepresentations were
made by an individual who did not have the authority to bind the
Appellees, it is undisputed that the Appellees did not misrepresent
facts to the Appellants.
The fourth subsection of Point II is that it is undisputed
that the Appellants did not rely on representations

of the

Appellees in entering into the "Agreement and Escrow". Reliance is
an element of negligence and/or careless misrepresentation. As it
is undisputed that the Appellees made no misrepresentations to the
Appellants, it is undisputed that the Appellants did not rely on
the statements of the Appellees.
POINT III:

The third point of the Appellees7 Brief is that

"On the Basis of the Appellants7 Own Deposition Testimony and
Answers to Interrogatories, It Is Undisputed That the Appellees
Were Not Part of a Scheme to Defraud the Appellants".

The third

cause of action of the Appellants7 Amended Complaint (which should
have properly been denominated Second Amended Complaint) was that
the Appellees had conspired with a third party. The conspiracy was
that the Appellees would pretend to be interested in purchasing
Larson Ford.

The Appellees would deplete the resources of Larson
5

Ford, then would fail to proceed with the purchase of Larson Ford,
which would then allow their co-conspirator to purchase the assets
of Larson Ford at a reduced price.

Appellant Walter P. Larson was

asked in deposition what evidence he had to support this plan of
collusion with the alleged co-conspirator, Stephen Wade.

The

Appellants were also asked by way of interrogatories what evidence
they had to support these allegations.

In Walter P. Larson's

deposition testimony, as well as in the answers to interrogatories,
the Appellants failed to set forth any admissible evidence that
would support the allegation that the Appellees had conspired to
deplete the assets of Larson Ford.
POINT IV:

The fourth point of the Appellees' Brief is

that "The Appellants Incorrectly Assert That the Lower Court Was
Unable to Rule Decisively".

In their brief, the Appellants claim

that the trial court was unable to rule decisively.
first

brought

a

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

The Appellees

requesting

the

dismissal of the cause of action for carelessly and/or negligently
made misrepresentations.

That motion was granted.

The Appellees

then brought another Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the
dismissal of the remaining cause of action, breach of contract.
That motion was also granted.

The Appellants then approached the

court and requested permission to amend their Complaint so as to
allow them to bring forth the cause of action that the Appellees
6

had conspired with a third party to drive down the price of Larson
Ford.

The court allowed the requested amendment.

The complaint

the Appellants filed contained not only the new cause of action,
but also the two old causes of action, breach of contract and
carelessly

and/or

negligently

made

misrepresentations.

Appellees then brought a Motion for Summary Judgment.
was denied.

The

That motion

In the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

dated July 7, 1992, the court indicated that the reason for the
denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment was that the court was of
the opinion that the Appellants had not had sufficient time in
which to develop their theory that the Appellees were trying to
deplete the assets of Larson Ford.

As the court allowed the

Appellants

after

to

amend

their

complaint

having

granted

the

Appellees two motions for summary judgment, and then allowed the
Appellants sufficient time in which to develop their theory of
conspiracy, it is correct to say that the trial court not only
ruled decisively, but also gave every opportunity to the Appellants
to present a factual dispute.
POINT V;

The final point of the Appellees' Brief is that

"The Appellees Have Not Made the Admissions Attributed To Them By
the Appellants".
Appellees

have

In their brief, the Appellants claim that the
made

certain

admissions.

By

virtue

of

the

Appellees' Answers to Request for Admissions and their Amended
7

Answers to Request

for Admissions, it is undisputed

that the

Appellees did not make the admissions attributed to them by the
Appellants.
DATED this

/tfi"

day of February, 1993.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

ry Caston
torneys for Appellees
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/ ^
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Rule 56(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after
the
expiration
of
20
days
from
the
commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof."

2.

Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall
if practicable ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted.
It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief
is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just.
Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
The Appellants claim the lower court erred in granting

the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment date May 26, 1992.
1

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT
BELOW,
1.

On or about July 1, 1983, Appellants filed their

Complaint. (Index pp. 2-9).
2.

The Complaint contained two causes of action.

The

first cause of action alleged breach of contract. The second cause
of action sought relief based on "carelessly and/or negligently
made false representations made by the defendants".
3.

The Appellees moved the lower court for a dismissal

of the second cause of action or, in the alternative, for a more
definite statement as the Appellants had failed to properly plead
the elements of fraud as required by Rule 9B of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Index pp. 77-80).
4.

On May 29, 1984, the lower court granted Appellees'

motion for a more definite statement and allowed the Appellants 10
days to amend their complaint.
5.

Appellants filed their amended complaint within the

time provided by the court.
6.

As did the original complaint, the Amended Complaint

contained causes of action for breach of the contract known as the
"Agreement and Escrow" and for "carelessly and/or negligently made
false representations". (Index pp. 111-118).
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7.

In August of 1988 the Appellees moved the Court for

partial summary judgment on the cause of action for carelessly
and/or

negligently

made

false misrepresentations.

The

points

presented in the supporting memorandum were that:
(a)

the Appellees did not misrepresent

facts to the

Appellants;
(b)

the Appellants did not rely on representations of
the Appellees in entering into the agreement and
escrow;

(c)

the Appellees did not act knowingly and recklessly;
and

(d)

the Appellants had not pled fraud with specificity.
(Index pp. 283-292).

8.

On August

26, 1988 the lower court granted

the

Appellees' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
9.

The Appellants then moved the Court for Summary

Judgment on the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. The
Points and Authorities in Support of that motion (Index pp. 339359) contended, based on the Appellants' own deposition testimony
and the relevant documents, that it was undisputed that:
(a)

the Appellees never entered into a contract with
the Appellants;
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(b)

even

if

the

Appellees

had

contracted

with

the

Appellants, the Appellees' obligations were subject
to an unfulfilled condition precedent in that the
"Amendment"

to

the

contract

provided

that

the

purchasers could "...cease active pursuit of the
plan of reorganization of Larson Ford, Inc."; and
(c)

in fact the contract had not been breached.

10.

On October 7, 1988, the lower court, ruling from the

bench, granted the Second Motion for Summary Judgment. (Index pp.
436, 437).
11.

The Appellants then claimed that there was a new

theory that their previous counsel had failed to advance.

The new

theory was that the Appellees were part of a scheme to defraud the
Appellants. (Index 446-456).
12.
Amended

The Court granted the Appellants' Motion to File an

Complaint

to allow the Appellants

to pursue

this new

theory.
13.

The Appellants' Amended Complaint (which should have

properly been denominated Second Amended Complaint) contains three
causes of action.

The first two causes of action are the same as

were contained in the original Complaint and the (first) Amended
Complaint.

These causes of action are breach of the contract dated

March 5, 1983, and negligent misrepresentation.
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The third cause of

action alleges fraud.

The third cause of action is where the

Appellants allege that the Appellees acted in collusion with
Stephen Wade to deplete Larson Ford's assets which would then allow
Wade to purchase the entity at a reduced price. (Index pp. 487573) .
14.

Following

the

Appellants

filing

the

Amended

Complaint, the Appellees again moved the lower court for Summary
Judgment. (Index pp. 593-593H).

The court did not grant the

Appellees' motion as the court was of the opinion that at the time
the Appellees had brought the motion, the Appellants had not had
sufficient time in which to pursue the matters set forth in the
Amended Complaint. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 7 ) .
15.

On the 27th day of May, 1992 the Appellees

their final Motion for Summary Judgment.

filed

On June 12, 1992 the

court heard oral argument on the Appellees' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Ruling from the bench, the court granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment were signed and entered
on July 7, 1992, and are attached hereto as Addendum A and B.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED BEFORE REVIEW
The Appellants claim that the lower court erred in granting
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 27, 1992. As the
Amended Complaint contained the same two causes of action (breach
5

of

contract

and

carelessly

and/or

negligently

made

false

misrepresentations) that had been dismissed by the court, the
Appellees incorporated the memoranda they had previously submitted.
These memoranda are found as Addendum C, D and E.

The memoranda

that was filed on May 27, 1992 (which is included as Addendum F)
presented the undisputed facts that warranted dismissal of the new
cause of action - fraud.

In the three subsections below, the

Appellees set forth the undisputed facts that were presented to the
lower court for each of the Appellants' three causes of action;
breach

of contract,

misrepresentations,

carelessly
and

the

and/or negligently

alleged

scheme

to

made false
defraud

the

Appellants.
A.

UNDISPUTED FACTS RELATED TO BREACH OF CONTRACT.
1.

Appellants in their Amended Complaint allege that

the Appellees breached the contract known as the "Agreement and
Escrow11.
2.

The "Agreement and Escrow" (which is Exhibit A to

Addendum C) was entered into on March 5, 1983, between Appellant
Walter P. Larson as Seller, Larson Ford Sales, Inc., and HBGH, an
intended corporation, as Seller.
3.

Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis W. Gay signed the

"Agreement and Escrow" on behalf of HBGH, an intended corporation
(Exhibit A of Addendum C).
6

4.

Prior to entering into the "Agreement and Escrow",

Larson Ford Sales had filed for relief pursuant to Chapter 11 of
the United State Bankruptcy Code.
5.

Pursuant to paragraphs E and F of the "Agreement and

Escrow":
"...the time for closing of this Agreement
shall be ten days from the date of
confirmation of the Larson Ford Sales plan of
reorganization
by
the
Bankruptcy
Court... Purchasers shall have the right to
rescind the purchase agreement and escrow in
the event that the Larson Ford Sales plan of
reorganization
is not approved by the
Bankruptcy Court.
Upon occurrence of this
event, the Purchasers have the right to
rescind this Agreement."
(Exhibit A of
Addendum C).
6.

The "Agreement and Escrow" incorporated an Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum of February 4,
1983. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum
were agreements between Bruno, Gay and/or their assigns, and
Appellant Walter P. Larson (Exhibits B & C of Addendum C).
7.

Pursuant to the Addendum the offer was subject to

the "...approval of the Federal Bankruptcy Court" (Exhibit C of
Addendum C).
8.

Concurrently with the execution of the "Agreement

and Escrow", Bruno and Gay entered into an Amendment with Appellant
Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford Sales, Inc. (Exhibit D of Addendum
C).

Paragraph 1 of the Amendment states that:

"It is agreed that the stock voting rights
will be reconveyed to Walter P. Larson in the
event the purchasers cause active pursuit of
the Plan of Reorganization of Larson Ford
Sales, Inc. (emphasis added).
9.

Pursuant to Section

1121 of the United

States

Bankruptcy Codef Larson Ford Sales had a 120-day exclusive period
in which to file a plan of reorganization.
10.

Pursuant to Section

1121 of the United

States

Bankruptcy Code, after the expiration of the 120-day period in
which Larson Ford Sales had an exclusive right to file a plan of
reorganization,

any

interested

party

could

file

a

plan

of

reorganization.
11.

The Purchasers' obligation under the "Agreement and

Escrow" were "contingent on the Bankruptcy Court's approval of a
plan of reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc."
12.

The Bankruptcy Court did note approve the plan of

reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
13.

The Bankruptcy Court did approve the second plan of

reorganization submitted by Stephen Wade.
14.

From March 21, 1983, HBGH supplied in excess of

$150,000 to Larson Ford Sales.1

(Affidavit of Owen Hogle, Index

360 and Addendum G ) .
1

Oddly, on page 8 of their Brief, Appellants state, "In
fact, it must be noted that Appellees never filed any affidavit in
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
8

15.

In paragraph

36

of the Amended

Complaint

the

Appellants allege that the Appellees had the obligation to "support
plaintiff's plan to the Bankruptcy Court on the terms agreed to
with

the

plaintiffs...and
16.

The

not

"Agreement

vote

for

a

and

Escrow"

competing
and

plan."

documents

incorporated into the "Agreement and Escrow":
(a)

do not set forth the terms of the bankruptcy

plan that the Appellants and Appellees allegedly
had agreed upon; and
(b)

do not state that the Appellees were prevented

from voting for a competing plan of reorganization
if the Bankruptcy Court rejected Larson Ford's plan
of reorganization.
17.

The Appellees were not obligated by or parties to

any of the aforementioned agreements.

(Exhibits A, B and C of

Addendum C)•
18.

The Appellees were never the assigns of Bruno and

Gay. (Affidavit of Owen Hogle, Index 360-361 and Addendum G ) .
19.

The Appellees were not and have never been officers,

directors or shareholders of HBGH. (Affidavit of Owen Hogle, Index
360-361 and Addendum G).
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20.

The Appellants were aware that HBGH was to become a

corporation and dealt with HBGH as a corporation.

(Deposition of

Sybil Larson, page 11, line 8; Addendum H ) .
21.

HBGH

became

a

corporation

on March

22, 1983.

(Exhibit E of Addendum C)
B.

FACTS RELATED TO NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS.
22.

In

paragraphs

41

through

43

of

the

Amended

Complaint, Appellants allege that Bruno and Gay, while acting as
agents

of

the

Appellees,

made

negligent

or

careless

misrepresentations to the Appellants.
23.

In paragraphs 45(a) through

(e) of the Amended

Complaint, Appellants set forth six misrepresentations that the
Appellees

through

Appellants.

"action,

conduct,

and

words" made

to

the

At least four of those alleged misrepresentations

refer to promises to perform certain acts in the

future.

The

alleged misrepresentations do not refer to then existing facts.
Further Appellants do not specify which misrepresentations were
made by actions and conduct and which were made by "words."
24.

On May 21, 1987, the Appellees took the deposition

of Appellant Walter P. Larson. Appellant Larson was asked numerous
questions

concerning

misrepresentations.

the

Appellant

Appellees'

alleged

Larson testified

that

false
(a) the

alleged misrepresentations were the Appellees' "failure to perform
10

on the basis of the agreement we'd drawn up..,11 (page 51, lines 17,
24; page 52, lines 4-7; page 53, lines 15-24; page 57, line 25;
page 58, lines 3-5); (b) misrepresentations were made by an
individual who had no authority to bind the Appellees (page 53,
lines 24, 15; page 54, lines 1-7); (c) the basis for its claim that
the Appellees knew their alleged misrepresentations were false when
they were made was that Appellee Owen Hogle was not present during
the "final negotiating..." (page 58, lines 18-22) and that "they
didn't follow through with it" (page 58, lines 8 and 9).

(Pages

51, 52, 53, 57 and 58 are attached as Addendum I).
25.

Appellant Larson did not have with him at the time

of the deposition any documentary evidence which would support his
claim that the Appellees knew the alleged misrepresentations were
false when made, but he would supply such evidence to Appellees'
counsel (page 61, lines 8, 25; page 62, lines 1-3; Addendum J ) .
26.

The

Appellees

never

received

any

documentary

evidence from the Appellants regarding Appellants' claims that the
defendants knew the alleged misrepresentations were false when
made.
27.

On February 16, 1988, the Appellees served upon the

Appellants Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents.
28.

Interrogatory No. 6 of Appellees' Interrogatories

asked the Appellants to state each and every fact which supports
11

Appellants'

claim

that

the

Appellees

made

fraudulent

misrepresentations and to identify and produce each and every
document which

supported

its claim

that the defendants made

fraudulent misrepresentations.
29.

In response to Interrogatory No. 6, Appellants

stated that an individual had made "claims and assurances that the
Appellees had "wealth" and that other "contacts" had stated that
the Appellees' name was "reliable and respected." Appellant Walter
P. Larson had testified at his deposition that the individual did
not have the authority to bind the Appellees.
C.

FACTS RELATED TO FRAUD.
31.

The Appellants' third cause of action alleges that

the Appellees:
(a)

Fraudulently

presently

represented

capable

and

that

interested

"they

are

in purchasing

Larson Ford" in order to induce the Appellants to
sell Larson Ford;
(b) Were
defendants
resources,
collusion

involved

in

planned
after
with

a
to

which
the

scheme

in

deplete
another

Appellees

which

Appellants'
individual

would

in

purchase

Appellants' assets at a greatly reduced price.

12

the

32.

At the deposition of Appellant Walter P. Larson on

May 21, 1987, Appellant Larson was asked if he had any "evidence
whatsoever that there was any collusion with Stephen Wade and the
defendants"

After a conference with his attorney, the Appellant

stated, on page 13, lines 8 through 17 (Addendum K) , that his
evidence of collusion consisted of Appellant being told at a date
he could not remember and from a person whom he could not recall
that:
"Wades and the Hogles had been in contact with
each other with the idea that was discussed
being the fact that Wade had an inside track
of some kind with Ford that they would be
approved as the dealer that if the Hogle group
wanted to protect the investment that they had
made the dealership to that point and time in
order to have the cooperation of the Wades
were they successful in getting a creditor/s
plan accepted, the whole group wanted to et
their money out, that they would withdraw."
33.

On January

28,

1992

the Appellees

served

the

Appellants with a set of Interrogatories and Request for Production
of Documents.

Interrogatory No. 4 asked the Appellants to set

forth the factual basis upon which they claimed that the Appellees
had participated in a plan to deplete the resources of Larson Ford
so as to allow a co-conspirator to purchase the assets of Larson
Ford at a greatly reduced price.
Interrogatory

No.

4

(Addendum

In Appellants' answer to

L) , the

Appellants

set

forth

absolutely no admissible evidence that there was any collusion
13

whatsoever between the Appellees and any other party to deplete the
assets of Larson Ford.
34.
the Motion

On June 11, 1992, one day prior to the hearing on

for Summary

Judgment,

the Appellants

filed their

responsive memorandum and the Affidavit of Walter Park Larson
(Addendum M) . The Affidavit does not indicate that the statements
are made upon personal knowledge.
ARGUMENT
POINT 12 THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES AS TO APPELLANTS' CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
A.

It Is Undisputed That the Appellees Did Not Enter Into A
Contract With The Appellants.

The first cause of action of the Appellants' Amended Complaint
alleges a breach of the "Agreement and Escrow" dated March 5, 1983.
For the Appellees to have breached this contract, they must have
been parties to that contract.

It is undisputed that Appellees

James and Owen Hogle are not parties to the "Agreement and Escrow".
The "Agreement and Escrow" is between HBGH, Inc. as purchaser and
Walter Park Larson as seller.

Stephen Bruno and Dennis Gay signed

the agreement on behalf of HBGH, an "intended corporation". At the
time the agreement was signed, HBGH was not a corporation.

HBGH

was incorporated on March 22, 1983. Appellant Sybil Larson stated
in her deposition that the appellants were aware HBGH was to become
a corporation, and treated it as such.
14
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The "Agreement and Escrow" incorporated an Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum dated February 4, 1983.
The Appellees are not parties to either of those documents.

The

parties to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase were
Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis W. Gay and/or assigns, and Appellant
Walter P. Larson. The parties to the Addendum are Walter P. Larson
for Larson Ford Sales and Stephen B. Bruno.

As was stated in

Appellee Owen Hogle's Affidavit, the Appellees were never the
assigns of Bruno, Gay or HBGH.
There is an Amendment to the "Agreement and Escrow" of March
5, 1983. That Amendment is between Stephen B. Bruno and Dennis Gay
as buyers and Appellants Walter P. Larson and Walter P. Larson,
president of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
The parol

evidence rule as set

forth

Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d

in FMA
327

Financial

(Utah 1980),

prevents the Appellants from introducing any evidence that would
contradict or vary the terms of the written agreements.
one caveat to the parol evidence rule.
evidence

that

is collateral

There is

A party may introduce

to the written

agreement.

The

collateral evidence may not be inconsistent with or repudiate the
terms of the written agreement.
Appellants claim that the Appellees were parties to the March
5,

1983 Agreement

by virtue

of representations

made

to the
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Appellants by agents of the Appellees. This assertion contradicts
and varies the terms of the written agreements. The Appellants may
not make use of the caveat to the parol evidence rule.

The

Agreement of March 5, 1983 (and other documentation in this case)
is void of even the slightest indication that the Appellees were
parties to the contract.

To claim otherwise is inconsistent and

varies an essential term of the March 5, 1983 Agreement.
It is significant to note that the parties who signed the
"Agreement and Escrow" and other documents did specify the capacity
in which they were signing each document.

On numerous documents,

Appellant Walter P. Larson signed for himself and for Larson Ford
Sales, inc. Gay and Bruno signed on their behalf and on behalf of
HBGH.

No document was signed on behalf of the Appellees.

B.

It

Is

Undisputed

That

The

Appellees'

Contractual

Obligations, If Any, Are Subject To An Unfulfilled
Condition Precedent.
If the Court finds that there is a factual dispute as to
whether the Appellees are parties to the "Agreement and Escrow",
summary judgment on the cause of action for breach of contract is
still

proper.

Pursuant

to

the

contractual

documents,

the

purchasers obligations were subject to an unfulfilled condition
precedent.

The case of Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1979)

is an example of where an individual's obligations to a contract do
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not arise due to an unfulfilled condition precedent.

In Creer the

plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant to purchase
a parcel of real estate.

The court found that the plaintiff knew

that there was a possibility that the defendant's ability to convey
title was based on a contingency.

The contingency did not occur

and the defendant was unable to convey title.

The court, in

holding that the defendant's contractual obligation had not arisen,
stated:
"Whether a provision in a contract is a
condition, the non-fulfillment of which
excuses performance, depends upon the intent
of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair
and reasonable construction of the language
used in light of all the circumstances when
they executed the contract." Id. at 51.
Should this court find that there is a factual dispute as to
whether the Appellees are parties to the contract, summary judgment
is still proper as the Appellees cannot be liable for a breach of
contract as it is undisputed that the purchasers' contractual
obligations are subject to a condition precedent that was never
satisfied.

Prior to the Agreement of March 5, 1983, Larson Ford

Sales had filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code.

The Appellants had, in accordance with Section

1121 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 120 days from the date
they filed for relief in which to file their own bankruptcy plan.
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Pursuant to paragraphs E and F of the March 5, 1983 "Agreement
and Escrow", the closing date was to be within ten (10) days from
the date the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Plan of Reorganization
submitted by Larson Ford Sales.

Pursuant to the "Agreement and

Escrow", if the Bankruptcy Court did not approve the plan of Larson
Ford Sales, the purchasers had the right to "rescind the purchase
"Agreement and Escrow". It is undisputed that the Bankruptcy Court
did not approve the plan submitted by Larson Ford.
Once the 120-day period in which the debtor has an exclusive
right to file a bankruptcy plan has expired, any other party in
interest may file a bankruptcy plan.

Once the bankruptcy court

approves a plan of an interested party, a debtor can no longer file
his own plan.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Stephen

Wade, as a party in interest, submitted a bankruptcy plan. Wade's
first plan was rejected.

Wade submitted a second plan which was

then approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

As it is undisputed that

the obligation to purchase Larson Ford was contingent upon the
Bankruptcy Court's approval of a plan submitted by Larson Ford, and
as it is undisputed that the Bankruptcy Court did not approve
Larson Ford's plan, it is also undisputed that the purchasers'
obligation to purchase Larson Ford was subject to an unfulfilled
condition precedent.
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C.

Pursuant

to the

"Amendment"

to the

"Agreement

and

Escrow", It Is Undisputed That the Purchasers Had the
Right to Cease Active Pursuit of Larson Ford's Plan of
Reorganization.
Should the Court find that there are factual disputes as to
whether (a) Bruno and Gay signed the "Agreement and Escrow" on
behalf of the Appellees; and (b) the purchasers' obligation under
the "Agreement and Escrow" is subject to an unfulfilled condition
precedent, summary judgment is still proper as there can be no
dispute that the Amendment to the "Agreement and Escrow" allowed
the purchasers to cease the pursuit of Larson Ford's plan of
reorganization.

The first paragraph of the Amendment states:

"It is agreed that the stock and voting rights
will be reconveyed to Walter P. Larson in the
event the purchasers cease active pursuit of
the plan of reorganization of Larson Ford.
Inc. (emphasis added)".
As it is undisputed that the Addendum to the "Agreement and
Escrow" gave the purchasers the absolute right to no longer pursue
the purchase of Larson Ford, the Appellants cannot create a factual
dispute by claiming that by way of affidavit the Appellees breached
the contract by failing to comply with the terms of the "Agreement
and Escrow".
POINT II; THERE IS NO GENUINE DISPUTE THAT THE APPELLEES DID
NOT MAKE CARELESS AND/OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS.
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The Appellants'
Appellees,

acting

Second

through

Cause

their

of Action

agent

Bruno

alleged
and

Gay,

that

the

falsely

represented:
(a)

that the Appellees would get releases from Citizen's

Bank and CSB Bank;
(b)

that the Appellees would substitute collateral with

the Small Business Administration;
(c)

that the Appellees would pay the outstanding sales

(d)

that the Appellees would personally commit funds;

(e)

that the Appellees would cooperate in the committing

tax;

and

of ...financial resources.
A.

The

Appellant's

Claim

of

Negligent

and/or

Careless

Misrepresentation Is Barred bv The Parol Evidence Rule.
In the immediately preceding section, the Appellees have set
forth the negligent and/or careless misrepresentations claimed by
the

Appellants.

These

"misrepresentations"

are

contractual obligations set forth in the "Addendum".

actually

Considering

that Bruno and Gay signed the "Agreement and Escrow", Addendum and
Amendment

as purchasers and in their own capacity without

any

indication that they were signing the documents on behalf of anyone
else, it is undisputed that Bruno and Gay obligated themselves
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(and/or HBGH) and no one else.

As was stated above, the parol

evidence rule prevents the Appellants from introducing evidence
that would vary or contradict the explicit terms of the written
agreements, unless the evidence is consistent with or does not
repudiate the terms of the written agreement.

To claim that the

Appellees were to perform certain acts when the written documents
state that it was Bruno and Gay (and/or HBGH) who were to perform
these acts is inconsistent with and repudiates an essential term of
the contract.
B,

It Is Undisputed That Negligent Misrepresentation Cannot
Apply In The Instant Case.

In Ellis v. Hale. 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962) this Court held
that:
"Negligent misrepresentation differs from intentional
representation in that in the former the representor
makes an affirmative assertion which is false without
having used reasonable diligence or competence in
ascertaining the verity of the assertion.
Moreover,
liability will only lie for negligent misrepresentation
when there is a special duty of care running from the
representor to the representee." Id. at 385.
In Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1979), the court
set forth the limited circumstances in which the representor is
held to a special duty of care:
"If the circumstances are such that the defendant could
exercise extraordinary influence over the plaintiff and
the defendant was or should have been aware the plaintiff
reposed trust and confidence in the defendant and
reasonable relief on defendant's guidance, then the
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parties
are
said
to
be
*in
confidential
relationship'....There are few relationships (such as
parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui) which the
law presumes to be confidential." Id. at 302.
The Appellants cite the case of Christensen v. Commonwealth
Land Title Insurance, 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983) to set forth the
elements of negligent misrepresentation.

The Appellants fail to

mention that in Christensen, just as in Ellis and Blodgett, the
court held that unless there is a special duty of care, there
cannot be negligent misrepresentation.

The court quoted 1 F.

Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts, § 7.6 at 546, for the
proposition that such a special relationship and duty of care
exists where the speaker is in the business of providing such
information:
"If, however, the information is given in the capacity of
one in the business of supplying such information, that
care and diligence should be exercised which is
compatible with the particular business or profession
involved. Those who deal with such persons do so because
of the advantages which they expect to derive from this
special competence.
The law, therefore, may well
predicate on such a relationship, the duty of care to
insure the accuracy and validity of the information." 1
F. Harper & F. James, supra, § 7.6 at 546.
It is undisputed that in the instant case there was no such
special duty of care or confidential relationship. The Appellants
do no argue in their brief that negotiations between Bruno and Gay
and the plaintiffs were anything but arms-length negotiations. The
Affidavit of Walter Park Larson is devoid of any assertion that
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there was a special duty of care or a confidential relationship.
Even should this Court find that Bruno and Gay were the agents of
the Appellees, the lower court properly dismissed the cause of
action

for

negligent

misrepresentation

as

negligent

misrepresentation does not apply to facts of the instant case.
C.

It Is Undisputed That The Appellees Did Not Misrepresent
Facts to the Appellants.

As was set forth above, the Appellants second cause of action
claims

that

the

Appellees

made

careless

and/or

negligent

misrepresentations. On May 21, 1987 Appellant Walter P. Larson was
deposed by the Appellees.
questions

concerning

the

Appellant Larson was asked numerous
alleged

false

misrepresentations.

Appellant Larson testified that (a) the alleged misrepresentations
were the Appellees' "failure to perform on the basis of the
agreement we'd drawn up..." (page 51, lines 17, 24; page 52, line
4-7; page 53, lines 15-24; page 57, line 25; page 58, lines 3-5);
(b) that misrepresentations were made by an individual who had no
authority to bind the Appellees (page 53, lines 24, 15; page 54,
lines

1-7) ; and

(c) that the basis for the claim that the

defendants knew their alleged misrepresentations were false when
they were made was that Appellee Owen Hogle was not present during
the "final negotiating..." (page 58, lines 18-22) and that "they
didn't follow through with it" (page 58, lines 8, 9).
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On

February

Interrogatories

16,
and

1988

Appellees

Request

for

served

Production

Appellants
of

with

Documents.

Interrogatory No. 6 asked the Appellants to state each and every
fact that supported the Appellants' claim that the Appellees had
made false misrepresentations.

In response, the Appellants stated

that an individual had made

"claims and assurances that the

defendants had wealth" and that other "contacts had stated that the
defendants' name was "reliable and respected."

On May 21, 1988

Appellant Walter P. Larson was deposed. Consistent with the abovementioned answer to Interrogatories, the Appellant had testified
that the misrepresentations were made by an individual named Steven
Brown, and that Mr. Brown did not have the authority to bind the
Appellees.

Despite

his

answers

to

Interrogatories

and

his

deposition testimony, the Appellants sought to forestall summary
judgment by filing an affidavit in which they claimed that the
Appellees, both personally and through their agents, made careless
and/or negligent misrepresentations.
In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), the Court
stated:
"...when a party takes a clear position in a deposition,
that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit
which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide
an explanation of the discrepancy." Id. at 1173.
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As

the

Affidavit

of

Walter

P.

Larson

contradicts

his

deposition testimony as well as his signed and sworn Answers to
Interrogatories, and as the Affidavit does not attempt to explain
the discrepancies between his Affidavit and his previous testimony,
it remains undisputed that the Appellees did not make careless
and/or negligent misrepresentations to the Appellants.
D.

It

Is Undisputed^ That

Appellants

Did

Not

Rely

on

Representations of the Appellees in Entering Into the
"Agreement and Escrow".
As was set forth in the preceding subsection, it is
undisputed that the Appellees did not make any careless and/or
negligent misrepresentations. In follows that if the Appellees did
not make any representations, it is also undisputed that the
Appellants could not have relied on any false misrepresentations
made by the Appellees.

Support for this position is found in

Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d

624

(Utah 1960).

In Dupler. the

plaintiff had purchased the defendant's interest in oil wells. The
plaintiff claimed that he had been induced to purchase these oil
wells by the defendant's false representations. The Supreme Court
of Utah affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant's motion
for summary judgment.
that

the plaintiff,

The court based its decision on the fact
in agreeing

to buy

the defendant's oil
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interests, had relied on representations made by individuals other
than the defendants:
"As a matter of law it is conceivable that a
person
might
simultaneously
rely
on
misrepresentations of divergent defendants.
However,
standing
alone
admissions
by
plaintiffs that they relied on others is
sufficient proof to negative reliance on the
present defendant." Id. at page 636.
In the instant case, as in Dupler, as the Appellants' sworn
testimony is that they relied on representations of others in
entering into the agreement, it is undisputed that the Appellants
did not rely on representations of the Appellees.
POINT III: ON THE BASIS OF THE APPELLANT'S OWN DEPOSITION
TESTIMONY AND ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES. IT IS UNDISPUTED
THAT APPELLEES WERE NOT PART OF THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD THE
APPELLANTS.
In the court below, the Appellees filed a total of four (4)
Motions for Summary Judgment. The first Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment addressed the Appellants' claim of carelessly made and/or
false misrepresentations. The lower court granted that motion and
dismissed the cause of action for false misrepresentations.

The

Appellees then moved the lower court for summary judgment on the
cause of action for breach of contract.

The lower court granted

that motion as well. After granting the Appellees7 second motion,
the Appellants pled with the Court to allow the Appellants to
pursue a cause of action that Appellants7 previous counsel had
failed to pursue.

The new theory was that the Appellees had
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conspired with Stephen Wade to drive down the value of Larson Ford.
The lower court allowed the Appellants to file an Amended Complaint
to pursue this new theory.

The new theory was presented

paragraph 56 of the Amended Complaint.

in

The paragraph alleges that

Appellants were involved in a scheme:
"where a buyer would approach a seller and offer
favorable terms which would be accepted by the seller.
After depleting the seller's resources and limiting his
ability to find other buyers, the original buyer would
step back and allow for the distressed sale to another
seconde [sic] buyer. The original buyer would profit
through moneys paid by a second buyer or through the
improper conversion of the seller's assets."
Appellant Walter P. Larson's sworn deposition testimony shows
that there is no genuine factual dispute that no such scheme
existed.

On page 10 of the deposition, Walter P. Larson was asked

if he "had any evidence whatsoever that there was any collusion
between Stephen Wade and the defendants..."

After attempting to

dodge the question and although Appellant Walter P. Larson did not
recall when or by whom he was so informed, he did recall that he
was told that:
"Wades and the Hogles had been in contact with each other
with the idea that was discussed being the fact that Wade
had an inside track of some kind with Ford that they
would be approved as the dealer, that if the Hogle group
wanted to protect the investment that they'd made in the
dealership to that point in time, in order to have the
cooperation of the Wades, were - were they successful in
getting a creditors' plan accepted, if the Hogle group
wanted to get their money out that they would withdraw."
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In short, the Appellants' entire evidence for the alleged
scheme is a hearsay conversation in which the Appellees discussed
with Stephen Wade the possibility of HBGH recovering through the
bankruptcy court the money it had supplied to Larson Ford Sales.
On January 28, 1992 the Appellees served the Appellants with
a second set of Interrogatories.

Interrogatory No. 4 stated:

"Regarding your belief that the defendants were involved
in a scheme in which the defendants planned to deplete
plaintiff's resources after which another individual in
collusion with the defendants would purchase plaintiff's
assets at a greatly reduced price, please state (a) each
and every fact upon which you base your belief; (b) the
title, location and individual in possession of each
document which supports your belief."
The Appellants' lengthy answer to this Interrogatory is devoid
of any admissible evidence that the Appellees were part of a scheme
to defraud the Appellants.
POINT IV; THE APPELLANTS INCORRECTLY ASSERT THAT THE LOWER
COURT WAS UNABLE TO RULE DECISIVELY.
On page 7 of their brief, the Appellants state that "The trial
court in this case was unable to clearly resolve the issues
presented to it and decisively rule."

It is imagined that the

Appellants make this statement in that it is easier to convince
this Court that the lower court erred if the lower court was not
certain as to whether there were genuine disputes.

In making this

assertion, the Appellants have completely mischaracterized the
proceedings in the court below.

On the 26th day of August, 1988,
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ruling from the bench, the lower court granted the Appellees' first
Motion for Summary Judgment and thereby dismissed the cause of
action for carelessly and/or negligently made misrepresentations.
On October 7, 1988 the lower court, ruling from the bench, granted
the Appellees' second Motion for Summary Judgment and thereby
dismissed the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. As is
set forth in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 7, 1992

(Addendum A),

following the court's granting of the second Motion for Summary
Judgment,

the

Appellants

pled

with

the

court

to

allow

the

Appellants to pursue a theory that the Appellants' previous counsel
had failed to advance. That cause of action was that the Appellees
had been part of a scheme to deplete Larson Ford's assets after
which the co-conspirator would purchase Larson Ford at a greatly
reduced price.

The court did allow the Appellants to file an

amended complaint to explore this new cause of action.

The

complaint filed by the Appellants contained the new cause of action
as well as the two old causes of action which had been previously
dismissed.

On July 6, 1989 the Appellees filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment.

On November 20, 1989, after having taken the

matter under advisement, the court denied the Motion for Summary
Judgment.

As is set forth in paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact,

the reason the court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment was
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none other than "the Court was of the opinion that at the time the
defendant had brought the motion, the plaintiff had not had
sufficient time to pursue the matters set forth in the Amended
Complaint."

On May 5, 1992, after having received the Appellants'

answers to Appellees' Interrogatories dated January 28, 1992, the
Appellees filed the Motion for Summary Judgment that is the subject
of this Court's review.

The procedural history demonstrates that

not only did the lower court rule decisively, but in allowing the
Appellants to amend their complaint to pursue the new theory after
the

court

had

granted

summary

judgment,

and

in denying

the

Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 17, 1989 so as to
allow the Appellants sufficient time to develop the allegations of
fraud, it is undisputed that the lower court allowed the Appellants
every opportunity to present a factual dispute, something the
Appellants have been unable to do.
POINT V:
THE APPELLEES HAVE NOT
ATTRIBUTED TO THEM BY THE APPELLANTS.

MADE

THE

ADMISSIONS

On page 13 of their brief, the Appellants claim that:
"Appellees have admitted that they met with
Appellants for the purpose of extending the
time within which conditions contained in the
Earnest Money Agreement had to be satisfied"
and that
"Appellees further admitted that Owen Hogle
filed personal financial statements with the
United States Bankruptcy Court indicating that
he intended to purchase Larson Ford."
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Attached hereto as Addendum N are the Appellees' Answers to
Plaintiff's First Set of Request for Admissions to Defendants James
Hogle, Jr. and Owen Hogle, and the Amended Answer to Plaintiff's
First Set of Request for Admissions to Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen Hogle.

In answering Admission No. 7, the Appellees denied

that they met with the Appellants to extend the time in which
conditions contained
satisfied.

in the Earnest Money Agreement had to be

In answering Admission No. 12, the Appellees denied

that Owen Hogle had filed personal financial statements with the
United

States Bankruptcy

Court indicating that he

intended to

purchase Larson Ford.
CONCLUSION
The Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the
lower

court's

Judgment

as

granting

based

on

of
the

the

Appellees' Motion

written

documents,

the

for

Summary

Appellants'

deposition testimony, Answers to Interrogatories and the Affidavit
of Appellee Owen C. Hogle, there are no genuine factual issues
disputing that:
(a)

Appellees James and Owen C. Hogle were not parties

to the written documents;
(b)
(whomever
precedent;

they

The

contractual

are)

are

obligations

subject

to

an

of

the

unfulfilled

purchasers
condition
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(c)

The purchasers (whomever they are) had the absolute

right to no longer pursue the purchase of Larson Ford;
(d)

The

cause

of

action

negligently made false representations

for

carelessly

is barred

and/or

by the parol

evidence rule;
(e)

There is no confidential relationship between the

Appellants and the Appellees;
(f)

The Appellants did not rely on any statements of the

Appellees; and
(g)

At

time

was

there

any

collusion

between

the

Appellees and any other individual to deplete the assets of Larson
Ford.
DATED this 3/<s

day of

/fj&fC/Qr'Y

, 1993.

McKAY# BURTON & THURMAN

By:
Harry /Caston
Attorneys for Appellees
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WALTER P. LARSON,
SYBIL LARSON and
JOHN LARSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs and
Counter-Defendants,
Civil No. C83-5542
v.
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR,, and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants and
Counter-Claimants«

On the 12th day of June, 1992 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. came on
to be heard defendant James and Owen Hogle's Motion for Summary
Judgment,

the

Honorable

Richard

H.

Moffat

presiding.

The

plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of record, John J.
Borsos and Hans M. Scheffler.

Defendants, James and Owen Hogle,

were represented by their counsel of record, Harry Caston.

The

Court having read the pleadings submitted by the parties, having
reviewed the file and having heard oral argument, now makes the
following

2
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed in June of 1984

contained two causes of action, a cause of action for breach of the
contract known as the Agreement and Escrow, and a cause of action
for "carelessly and/or negligently made false misrepresentations".
2.

Defendants James and Owen Hogle moved

the Court

for

partial summary judgment on the cause of action for carelessly
and/or

negligently

made

false

misrepresentations.

The

Court

granted the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

as

there were no genuine issues as to any of the material facts:
(a)

that

Defendants

James

and

Owen

Hogle

made

any

representations to the plaintiffs;
(b)

there were any representations made to the plaintiff

of a then presently existing material fact;
(c)

the plaintiffs did not rely on representations of

the Hogles;
(d)

that

if

anything,

the

plaintiffs

relied

on

representations made by others who were not agents or authorized to
speak on behalf of the Hogles;
(e)
3.

that the Hogles did not act>knowingly or recklessly.

The Hogles then moved the Court for summary judgment on

the remaining cause of action, breach of contract.

The Court

granted the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as the Court
found

that

there were

material facts:

no genuine

issues

as

to

the

following

3
(a)

the Hogles were not parties to any of the agreements

with the plaintiff and/or Larson Ford;
(b)

the Agreement and Escrow and Addendum allowed the

purchasers to cease efforts to purchase Larson Ford;
(c)
Escrow

was

the purchasers' obligation under the Agreement and

contingent

upon

a

condition

precedent

which

was

unfulfilled.
4.

The plaintiff then claimed that there was a new theory

that plaintiffs7 previous counsel had failed to advance.

This new

theory was that the Hogles were part of a scheme to defraud the
plaintiff. This theory held that the Hogles conspired with Stephen
The plan was that the Hogles would deplete the plaintiffs7

Wade.

business assets which would then allow Stephen Wade to purchase the
assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced price.
The Court granted the plaintiffs7 Motion to File an

5.
Amended

Complaint to allow the plaintiffs to pursue this

new

theory.
The plaintiffs7 Amended Complaint (which should properly

6.

be denominated Second Amended Complaint) contains three causes of
action.

The first two causes of action are the same as were

contained
Amended

in the original Complaint and the plaintiffs7

Complaint.

First

These causes of action are breach of the

contract dated March 5, 1983, and negligent misrepresentation.
third cause of action alleges fraud.

The

This new cause of action is

where the plaintiff alleges that the Hogles acted in collusion with

4
Stephen Wade to deplete Larson Ford's assets which would then allow
Wade to purchase the entity at a reduced price.
7.

That

Complaint, the
judgment.

following
defendant

the

plaintiff's

again moved

the

filing

the

Amended

Court

for

summary

The Court did not grant the defendant's motion as the

Court was of the opinion that at the time the defendant had brought
the motion, the plaintiff had not had sufficient time in which to
pursue the matters set forth in the Amended Complaint.

The

defendants subsequently filed the Motion for Summary Judgment that
is now before the Court.
8.

That the plaintiffs have failed to present any new

evidence by way of affidavit or documentation which would raise a
genuine issue to any of the material facts raised in Defendant
Hogles' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the causes of action
for breach of contract and negligently and/or carelessly made false
misrepresentations.
9.

The

plaintiff's

new

cause

of

action

alleges

that

Defendants James and Owen Hogle acted fraudulently and that they
joined forces with Stephen Wade to deplete the assets of Larson
Ford.

Particularly, the plaintiffs claim that the Hogles never

intended to purchase the assets of Larson Ford, that the Hogles
undertook to manage Larson Ford in a slipshod manner and then
withdraw which would allow Stephen Wade to purchase the assets of
Larson Ford at a reduced price.
10.
Larson.

That the defendants took the deposition of plaintiff Park
The plaintiff was asked to explain the factual basis of

5
his claim of fraud against the Hogles.

The plaintiff's answer to

the deposition question does not in any way raise a factual dispute
that the Hogles fraudulently schemed to deplete the assets of
Larson Ford so as to allow Stephen Wade to purchase the dealership.
11.

The plaintiff

was asked

by

the defendant

through

interrogatories to identify the factual basis of his claim that the
Hogles had acted fraudulently.

The plaintiff's answer to this

interrogatory as well as to the deposition question does not in any
way raise the factual dispute that the Hogles fraudulently schemed
to deplete the assets of Larson Ford to allow Stephen Wade to
purchase the dealership.
12.

The Court also finds that there is no genuine factual

dispute that the Hogles fraudulently entered into a contract with
the plaintiffs in that:
(a)

that the Hogles did not enter into any agreement

with the plaintiff; and
(b)

that the parties to the Agreement and Escrow had a

right to cease pursuit of the purchase of Larson Ford.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As there are no genuine issues as to any of the material facts
raised in the plaintiff's Complaint, it is just and proper that the
Court grant Defendant James and Owen Hogle's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
DATED this

n

day of
(/

BY THJ^COURT:

y

DISTRICT

JUDGE

/V"^' * V

'

' ^ ^ J

\

Approved as to form:
John J. Borsos, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff

Hans M. Scheffler, Esq,
Attorney for Plaintiff

eliz\harry\hogle6.fof
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I hereby certify that on theJ3P/fc/day of June, 1992, true and
correct copies of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
John J. Borsos
370 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hans M. Scheffler
311 South State, #380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM B

Third Judicial P'^rict

HARRY CASTON (4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen C. Hogle
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135

J U L - 7 1992
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By-

Dbputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WALTER P. LARSON,
SYBIL LARSON and
JOHN LARSON,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs and
Counter-Defendants,
Civil No. C83-5542
v.
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants and
Counter-Claimants«

On the 12th day of June, 1992 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. came on
to be heard Defendants James and Owen C. Hogle's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of

record, John J. Borsos and Hans M. Scheffler. Defendants James and
Owen C. Hogle were represented by their counsel of record, Harry
Caston.

The Court having heard the arguments of the parties,

having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having made its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing,
it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1.

That Defendants James and Owen'C. Hogle's Motion for

Summary Judgment be granted.
DATED this

~~] day of

A

, 1992.
^

BY THE COURT:

J-A—

RICHARD U. MOFFAT
DISTRICT/COURT JUDGE

Approved as to form:
John J. Borsos, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff

Hans M. Scheffler, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff

eliz\harry\hogle6.ord
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the X ' day of June, 1992, true and
correct copies of the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary
Judgment were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

John J. Borsos
370 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hans M. Scheffler
311 South State, #380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM C

9/**

WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN (3267)
HARRY CASTON (4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen C. Hogle
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON
and JOHN LARSON,
Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants.
vs

DEFENDANTS* OWEN AND JAMES
HOGLE'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.,

Civil No. C83-5542

Defendants and CounterClaimants .

Judge Richard H. Moffat

FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint that

the defendants have breached the contract known as the
"Agreement and Escrow," a copy of which is attached hereto and
hereby made Exhibit "A".

- 2 2.

The Agreement and Escrow was entered into on March

5, 1983, between plaintiff, Walter P. Larson, Larson Ford Sales,
Inc. and HBGH, an intended corporation.
3.

Defendants Stephen Bruno and Dennis W. Gay signed

the Agreement and Escrow for HBGH, an intended corporation.
4.

The Agreement and Escrow incorporated an Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum of February 4,
1983, all of which are attached hereto and are hereby made
Exhibits "B" and "C". The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase and Addendum were agreements between defendants Bruno,
Gay and/or their assigns and Walter P. Larson.
5.

That concurrently with the execution of the Agree-

ment and Escrow, defendants Bruno and Gay entered into an
Amendment (a copy of which is attached hereto and hereby made
Exhibit "D") with Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
Paragraph 1 of the Amendment states that:

"It is agreed that

the stock voting rights will be reconveyed to Walter P. Larson
in the event the purchasers cease active pursuit of the Plan of
Reorganization of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
6.

(emphasis added)

That prior to entering into the Agreement and

Escrow, Larson Ford Sales had filed for relief pursuant to
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

- 3 7.

Pursuant to Section 1121 of the United States

Bankruptcy Code, Larson Ford Sales had a 120-day exclusive
period in which to file a Plan of Reorganization.
8.

That pursuant to Section 1123 of the United States

Bankruptcy Co4e, after the expiration of the 120-day period in
which Larson Ford Sales had an exclusive right to file a Plan of
Reorganization, any interested party could file a Plan of
Reorganization.
9.

That the defendants' obligation under the Agreement

and Escrow was "contingent on the Bankruptcy Court's approval of
a Plan of Reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc."
10.

The Bankruptcy Court did not approve the Plan of

Reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
11.

The Bankruptcy Court did approve the second Plan of

Reorganization submitted by Stephen Wade.
12.

That from March 21, 1983, HBGK supplied in excess

of $150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales.
13.

Plaintiffs' claim in paragraph 3 of the Amended

Complaint that the defendants had the obligation to "take such
steps as to submit a satisfactory plan to the Bankruptcy Court
as required in the contract."
14.

The Agreement and Escrow does not obligate the

defendants to take such steps as to submit a satisfactory plan
to the Bankruptcy Court.

- 4 15.

Plaintiff Sybil Larson was never a party to any of

the aforementioned agreements.
16.

Defendants James and Owen Hogle were not obligated

by or parties to any of the aforementioned documents.
17.

That defendants James and Owen Hogle were not and

have never been officers, directors or shareholders or HBGH.
18.

Plaintiffs were aware that HBGH was to become a

corporation and dealt with HBGH as a corporation (deposition of
Sybil Larson, page 11, line 8).
19.

HBGH became a corporation on March 22, 1983.

20.

The Hogles were never the assigns of Bruno and Gay. j

POINT I

I

THE HOGLES DID NOT ENTER INTO A CONTRACT WITH THE PLAINTIFFS

I

The First Cause of Action of Plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint alleges that the defendants breached a contract of March j
i
i

5, 1983.

There can be no argument that it is impossible for a

person to breach a contract to which he is not a party.

James

and Owen Hogle were not parties to the contract of March 5,
1983.

|
'
j

The contract (otherwise referred to as the "Agreement and !

Escrow") is between HBGH, Inc, as purchaser and Walter Park
Larson as seller.

Defendants Stephen Bruno and Dennis Gay

Signed the agreement on behalf of HBGH.

At the time the agree-

ment was signed, HBGH was not a corporation.

However, HBGH was

incorporated on March 22, 1988. As Sybil Larson stated in her

I

- 5 deposition, the plaintiffs were aware HBGH was to become a
corporation.
The Agreement of March 5, 1983, incorporated an Earnest

j

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum dated February I
4, 1983.
ments.

The Hogles are not parties to either of those docu-

The parties to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to

j
t
i

Purchase were Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis W. Gay and/or assigns ;
and Walter P. Larson.

The parties to the Addendum are Walter P. J
i

Larson for Larson Ford Sales and defendant Stephen P. Bruno.

•

The Hogles were never the assigns of Bruno, Gay or HBGH.
There was an amendment to the Agreement of March 5,

j
I
j

That amendment was between Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis

j

i

1983.

Gay as buyers and Walter P. Larson and Walter P. Larson, presi- I
«

dent of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.

;
!

Plaintiffs suggest that even though the Hogles did not

,

sign any agreements with the plaintiffs, the Hogles are liable
for the alleged breach of contract for two reasons.

The first

reason is that agents of the Hogles represented to the plaintiffs that the Hogles were in fact parties to the contract.
second argument is that because HBGH was never a corporation,

The ,
!
i
i

the Hogles were partners in HBGH.
valid.

Neither of these theories are !

The parol evidence rule as set forth in FMA Financial

Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980),

I

- 6 prevents the plaintiffs in this case from introducing any
evidence which would contradict or vary the terms of the parties
written agreements•
rule.

There is one caveat to the parol evidence

A party may introduce evidence that is collateral to the

written agreement.

The collateral evidence may not be inconsis-

tent with the written agreement.

The collateral evidence may

not repudiate the terms of the written agreement.
To reiterate, plaintiffs claim that the Hogles are
actually parties to the March 5, 1983 Agreement by virtue of
representations made to the plaintiffs by agents of the Hogles.
This assertion certainly contradicts and varies the terms of the
written agreement.

The plaintiffs may not make use of the

caveat to the parol evidence rule.

The Agreement of March 5,

1983 (or any other documentation for that matter) is void of
even the slightest indication that the Hogles were parties to
the contract.

To claim otherwise is inconsistent and varies an

essential term of the March 5, 1983 Agreement.
It is significant that the parties who signed the
Agreement and Escrow and other documents did specify the
capacity in which they were signing each document.

On numerous

documents, plaintiff Walter P. Larson signed for himself and for
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. Defendants Gay and Bruno signed on
their behalf and on behalf of HBGH.
agreement on behalf of the Hogles.

No one ever signed any

- 7Plaintiffs1 second claim, that the Hogles are liable by
virtue of the fact that the Hogles were partners in HBGH as HBGH
never incorporated is absurd.

HBGH was a corporation.

The

Certificate of Incorporation attached hereto and hereby made
Exhibit "E" proves that fact.

HBGH was a corporation during the

time it paid $150,000.00 to cover the operating expenses of
Larson Ford, Inc.
POINT II
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS WERE SUBJECT TO AN
UNFULFILLED CONDITION PRECEDENT
There are instances when an individual's contractual
obligations do not arise until a condition precedent has been
satisfied.

An example is the case of Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d

149 (Utah 1978).

In Creer the plaintiff entered into an agree-

ment with the defendant to purchase a parcel of real estate.
The court found that the plaintiff knew that there was a possibility that the defendant's ability to convey title was based
on a contingency.

The contingency did not occur and the defen-

dant was unable to convey title.

The court, in holding that the

defendant's contractual obligation had not arisen, stated:
"Whether a provision in a contract is a
condition, the non-fulfillment of which excuses
performance, depends upon the intent of the
parties, to be ascertained from a fair and
reasonable construction of the language used in
light of all the circumstances when they executed the contract." Id. at 51.

- 8 Defendants James and Owen Hogle vigorously cling to the
argument stated above, that the Hogles were not parties to the
contract that is the subject of this action.

Assuming for the

sake of argument, the court finds that the Hogles were parties
to the contract; the Hogles and the other defendants cannot be
liable for a breach of contract as the defendant's contractual
obligations were subject to a condition precedent.
tion precedent was never satisfied.

That condi-

Prior to the Agreement of

March 5, 1983, Larson Ford Sales had filed for relief under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

The plaintiffs

had, in accordance with Section 1121 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code, 120 days from the date they filed for relief in
which to file their own bankruptcy plan.
Pursuant to paragraphs E and F of the March 5, 1983
Agreement and Escrow, the closing date of the agreement was to
be within ten days from the date the Bankruptcy Court confirmed
the Plan of Reorganization submitted by Larson Ford Sales.

If

the Bankruptcy Court did not approve the plan of Larson Ford
Sales, the defendants had the right to "rescind the purchase
Agreement and Escrow.11

The Bankruptcy Court did not approve the

plan submitted by Larson Ford.
Once the 120-day period in which the debtor has an
exclusive right to file a bankruptcy plan has expired, any other
party in interest may file a bankruptcy plan.

Once the

- 9bankruptcy court approves a plan of an interested party, the
debtor can no longer file his own plan.

In the instant case,

Stephen Wade, as a party in interest, submitted a bankruptcy
plan.

Wade's first plan was rejected.

Wade submitted a second

plan which was then approved by the Bankruptcy Court.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT BREACH THE AGREEMENT OF MARCH 5, 1983
In paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs
claim that the defendants breached the contract by failing to
deliver any consideration that was called for in the agreement
and failing to submit a satisfactory plan to the Bankruptcy
Court as required in the contract.

The first problem with this

allegation is that a review of the contract reveals that the
defendants did not have an obligation to submit a satisfactory
plan to the Bankruptcy Court.

In fact, the Amendment to the

Agreement and Escrow gave the defendants the right to cease
active pursuit of the Plan of Reorganization.

The second

problem with this allegation is that HBGH supplied over
$150,000.00 from March 21, 1983, through June, 1983 to Larson
Ford Sales.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS OWEN AND JAMES HOGLE ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEE INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS ACTION
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 1953 as amended, the court may impose a sanction including

- 10 reasonable expenses and a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in
the defense of a pleading that is not well grounded in fact,
warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument.

There can

be no question that plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint offends the
standard of Rule 11. Plaintiffs1 link to defendants Owen and
James Hogle is the assertion that HBGH was never a corporation.
A ninety-second telephone call to the Department of Business
Regulations would have informed plaintiffs that HBGH was in fact
a corporation.

In paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint, plain-

tiffs assert that the defendants entered into the contract
individually and as partners of HBGH.
above, this assertion is false.

As has been discussed

Defendants Gay and Bruno

entered into contracts with the plaintiff Walter Larson.

As if

these falsehoods were not sufficient, in paragraph 3 of the
Amended Complaint the plaintiffs assert that the defendants
failed to deliver consideration and to take the necessary steps
to submit a satisfactory bankruptcy plan.

As was stated above,

these allegations have no correlation to the truth.
supplied $150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales.

HBGH

It is odd that

plaintiffs contend that the defendants had an obligation to
submit a bankruptcy plan when in fact the amendment to the
Agreement and Escrow allows the defendants to unequivocally
cease active pursuit of such a plan.

- 11 -

I

POINT V

I

PLAINTIFF SYBIL LARSON WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT
OF MARCH 5, 1983

I

Should the court not grant defendantsf Motion for
Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs1 First Cause of Action,

J

plaintiff Sybil Larson should be removed as a plaintiff as Sybil j
Larson was not a party to the Agreement of March 5, 1983.
CONCLUSION

I

Defendants James and Owen Hogle are entitled to summary j
judgment on plaintiffs' First Cause of Action as there are no
genuine disputes as to any of the material facts.

j

The undisput-

ed fact is that Owen and James Hogle were not parties to the
contract that is the subject matter of this lawsuit.

|

Similarly, j

Sybil Larson was not a party to the contract that is the subject j
matter of this lawsuit.

The Hogles were not hidden principals.

They were not the assigns of defendants Bruno and Gay.

The

j

plaintiffs entered into a contract with certain individuals.

j

The Hogles are not these individuals.

I

Any evidence to the

contract is prohibited by the parol evidence rule.
There is no genuine dispute that the plaintiffs were

j
I

negotiating with defendants Bruno and Gay individually and with |
Bruno and Gay as representatives of HBGH.

The plaintiffs knew

all along that HBGH was to become a corporation.
fact incorporate on March 22, 1983.

HBGH did in

j

- 12 There can be no factual dispute that the obligation of
the parties to the March 5, 1983 contract could not arise until
the Bankruptcy Court had approved the Larson Ford Sales Plan of
Reorganization.
plan.

The Bankruptcy Court did not approve Larson's

Thus, assuming for the sake of argument, that the Hogles

were parties to the contract, the fact that Larson's plan was
never approved by the Bankruptcy Court prevents any obligation
the Hogles may have had from arising.
Assuming once again for the sake of argument, that not
only were the Hogles parties to the March 5, 1983, contract, but
also that the Hogles obligation to perform under the contract
had arisen, the Hogles would still be entitled to summary
judgment.

That is because there is no genuine debate that the

Hogles did not breach the contract.

The alleged breaches in the

contract are a failure to deliver consideration and failure of
the defendants to take the necessary steps to submit a satisfactory plan to the Bankruptcy Court.

The undisputed evidence is

that HBGH did supply $150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales.

Further

the defendants could not have breached the contract by failing
to take such steps as necessary to submit a satisfactory plan to
the Bankruptcy Court as the defendants were not required to do
so.
Defendants James and Owen Hogle are entitled to sanctions against the plaintiffs as the allegations in their Amended
Complaint are completely at odds with the undisputed evidence.

- 13 Dated this

day of September, 1988.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

By
William Thomas Thurman
Harry Caston
Attorneys for Defendants
Owen and James Hogle
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the

day

of September, 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
JOHN J. BORSOS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
807 East South Temple, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Mr. Dennis W. Gay
780 West 889 South
Payson, Utah 84651
Stanley Adams, Esq.
Attorney for Stephen P. Bruno
521 Sixth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Dated this

HC06/13

day of September, 1988.

EXHIBIT /w
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dj.'

EXHIBIT

FOR m*-"
AGREEMENT AND ESCROW

AN AGREEMENT dated this * T

5V/-f7

<**y of Ksrch, 1983, by snd

to as "Purchasers" sad WALTER PARK LARSON, hereinafter referred
to MM nS*UMr"*
RECITALS
Seller is the owner of all of the issued and outstanding

coaraon shares of Larson Ford Sales, a Delaware corporation, and
further represents that he is authorised to represent any parties
claiming MA interest in said stock for the purpose of carrying out
the objectives of this Agreement.
2*

Larson Ford Sales has filed a petition for relief under

Chapter U of the Bankruptcy Act which is presently pending before
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah*
Seller Is an officer end director of Larson Ford Sales
end is^puchorized to execute this Agreement on behalf of Larson
Ford Sales Insofar as this Agreement effects the implementation
of the debtor1 s plan of reorganisation and the day-to-day operation of the business of Larson.Ford Sales*
4«

Purchasers, desire to purchase ell of the issued and

outstanding ehates of Larson Ford Sales and desl?% further to^
*MBM**-the ially operations of Larson FortrSeles, including dl~.
*^fcLa^t^^jlQrmula£toa of the "plan of reorganisation, for Larson
_Foard\54Xe*

17-4)

PAUUTTE fOTH£R«JpWkM,Wt CSR. RPR
WITNESS "j?C T^MjilU

betweenttBCH,INC, (an intended corporation) hereinafter referred

1.

2

5. The parties desire to establish an escrow account with
Harold R. Stephens, Attorney at Law, 320 -South 300 East, Salt Lake
City9 Utah, 84111. telephone (801) 328-0645, to act as the escrow
agent to carry out the terms and conditions of the escrow.

IN CONSIDERATION OF the mutual promises contained herein,
the parties agree as follows:
A.

Seller agrees to sell to Purchasers ?$Z of his sharts

of the common stock of Larson Ford Sales together with all of the
remaining issued and outstanding shares of Larson Ford Sales.
Seller shall deliver all of said shares9 properly endorsed and
assigned, to the escrow agent within 5 days from the execution
of this Agreement, together with proper assignment of voting rights.

-~--~ae » r : : ^ a^rse :r.ac :r.a : i = e for - l o s i n g of
%

*itail 3* «!=:«.» :2a oays iron

: I « ' M C 2 O£

this

confirmation

r s o r u a m z a t i o n 3y ::ie ^anxrustzy
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WITNESS N
rJlhmrrU
^HXSijIS^s^.ADDSSfDCIi TO thet. certain Earnest Money
:eiptuand Offer to Purchase dated
Ifebru&i
. Cay and/or assigns appear as
t 1983 viarein Stephen P. Bruno, Dennis
purchasers of th> # business at 5500 South State S t r e e t , Hurray, Utah, known as Larson
.the ^oSa^pV&chase price to be $175,000.00 to be paid in the form of cash notes or
ireaX.
e s t a t e deeced acceptable to t h e S e l l e r .
s

l & •'" •• • ^'^;*V

£urch£ser #£rees to purchase all assets of Larson Pord, including property lease,
j«tock in the/,corporation, all parts, furniture, fixtures, signs, accessories, equip''aiasxt and air other items used in the operation of Larson Ford, together with all
[liabilities of the business.
jfgj&P ,*$;••* .tojfurjxish the Purchaaer with a liat of all Laraon Pord Assets. Seller
£P**a•Vq*,/urnistiL,!'the Purchaaer with a list of all Larson Ford's personal property.
frhe assets^and peraonal property should include but not be limited to: signs, furniture, -fixture*, apparatus, equipsont, machinery, tools, leasehold improvements, cars,
^accessories* parts and appliances ZT.* replacements thereto, if any, owned by Larson
•frofd esd located on or attached to the premises or used in connection with the operation
fof the premises.
Seller agrees to cake available to Purchaser's agent, at Larson Ford's place of buaines*.
all books, recotds and other personal documents.
< .
purchaser agrees to sign over to Seller all right, title, liability and all ircerest
in the fire insurance claim currently in dispute.
Purchaser sgrees to negotiate suVtitute collateral to actcr.plish release of Larson's
personal liability to Citiz2ns i;-.r.x, 2ions Firjt K-.ti.2raI Sr.r.x, Commercial Se(urity
Bank, Small Business Administration, and State Tax Comission.
Purchaser understands that there is an immediate cash flow problem at the business,
asd upon removal of all ether contingencies, •'.11 b'j willing Co influx needed capital
into the business to keep it functioning during the escrow period.
Seller represents thet the total monies due to all creditors exclusive of any interest o
sales tax or S3A, is no more than $2,100,000.00. In the event that the total monies
due to all creditors is more than $2,100*000.00, the amount over $2,100,000.00 shall
be deducted from the purchase price and downpayment respectively.
Seller agrees to execute a "Non-Competition Agreement" agreeing not to have an ownership interest in a Ford dealership within a radius of fiva (5) miles from Larson Ford
for a period of five years, carrying with it a penalty of $500,000.00 if Seller is
found in violation of the Agreement.
Purchaser agrees to honor an agreement with Salt Lake School District for "loaner"
cars*
Purchaser agrees: to furnish the Sellers with two (2) demos through August, 1983,
at no cost.
/ T h i s offer subject tc approval of Purchaser's and Seller's attorneys of final Buy-Sell
I Agreement, and appiwwl of the Federal Bankruptcy Court.
Purchaser agrees to allow the Seller to purchase cars or trucks for Seller's personal
use at Invoice price.
This offer subject to and contingent upon the following:
1. Approval of Ford Motor Corporstion of franchise transfer or acceptable solution
to the franchise
2. Purchaser's inspection and approval 'jf property lease, such approval to be in writing
3. Purchaser's inspection and approval of the list of the assets and the list of
personal property, such approval a.v- acceptance to be in writing
A. Purchaser accepting and approving the findings of his agent after the inspection
of the books, records and other personal documents. Such approval and ^ ^ c a n c ^
shall be in writing.
^X'j2(/ll*
All contingencies shall be remevad in writing by noon, Tuesday. February^£V9S3(£^
Buy*r agrees to ?*•; to Wcrdley Corporation a finder's fee of $75,000.00 to be p a &
s- closing. Closing sh-iii be on or before March 15, i ^ 3 *
.-

Date:

Pete:
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CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
OF
HBGH, INC.
I. DAVID S. MONSON, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF UTAH,HERESY CERTIFY
THAT DUPLICATE ORIGINALS OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION FOR THE INCORPORATION OF
HBGH, INC.
DULY SIGNED AND VERIFIED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF THE UTAH BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT, HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN MY OFFICE AND ARE FOUND TO CONFORM
TO LAW.
ACCORDINGLY, BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I HEREBY
ISSUE THIS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF
HBGH, INC.
AND ATTACH HERETO A DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION.
102e79.

IN TESTIMONY

WEREOF,

I have hereunto

set my hand and affixed the Great Seal of the
State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, this

'HI

0f

MARCH _.

>+*»****

UELTENANT GOVERNOR

f

.?.?. day
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ADDENDUM D

WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN (3267)
HARRY CASTON (4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen C. Hogle
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON
and JOHN LARSON,
Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants .

vs
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.,

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS HOGLES'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO
DISMISS
Civil No. C83-5542

Defendants and CounterClaimants.

Judge Richard H. Moffat

FACTS
1.

On or about July 1, 1983, plaintiffs filed their

complaint.
2.

The complaint contained two causes of action. The

second cause of action sought relief based on "carelessly and/or
negligently made false representations made by the defendants."

- 23.

Defendants brought a motion to dismiss the second

cause of action or in the alternative, a motion for a more
definite statement as the plaintiffs had failed to properly
plead the elements of fraud as is required by Rule 9B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

On May 29, 1984, this Court granted defendants1

motion for a more definite statement and allowed the plaintiffs
10 days to amend their complaint.
5.

Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint within the

time provided by the Court.
6.

That paragraph 9 of the plaintiffs1 amended com-

plaint alleges that "defendants carelessly and/or negligently
made false representations that they could and would perform the
conditions described in the agreements between the parties."
7.

On May 21, 1987, defendant Hogle took the deposi-

tion of plaintiff Walter P. Larson.

Plaintiff was asked numer-

ous questions concerning the defendants1 alleged false misrepresentations.

The plaintiff testified that (a) t-h<? ^n^gp.H

^

misrepresentations were the defendants1 "failure to perform on
the basis of the agreement we'd drawn up . . . "

(Page~~5l, line

17, 24; Page 52, lines 4-7; Page 53, lines 15-24; Page 57, line
25; Page 58, lines 3-5); (b) that misrepresentations were made
by an individual who had no authority to bind the HogTesT—'(Page
53, line 24, 25; Page 54, lines 1-7); (c) tliat the basis for its

- 3 claim that the defendants knew their alleged misrepresentations
were false when they were made was that defendant Owen Hogle was
not present during the "final negotiating. . . ." (Page 58,
lines 18-22) and that "they didn't follow through with it" (Page
58, lines 8 and 9).
Plaintiff did not have with him at the time of the
^position any documentary evidence which would support his
claim that the defendants knew the alleged misrepresentations
were false when made, but he would supply such evidence to
defendants1 counsel (Page 61, lines 8 and 25; Page 62, lines
1-3).
9.

Defendants have never received any documentary

evidence from plaintiffs regarding plaintiffs' claims that the
defendants knew the alleged misrepresentations were false when
made.
10.

On February 16, 1988 defendants served upon plain-

tiffs Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents,
a copy of which is attached hereto and made Exhibit "A".
11.

Interrogatory No. 6 of defendants' Interrogatories

asks the plaintiffs to state each and every fact which supports

M

plaintiffs' claim that defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations and to identify and produce each and every document
which supported its claim that the defendants made fraudulent

\fl

misrepresentations.

- 4/

12.

In response to Interrogatory No. 6, a copy of which

14 is attached hereto and made Exhibit

lf lf

B , plaintiffs stated that

an individual had made "claims and assurances that the defendants had wealth" and that other "contacts" had stated that the
defendants1 name was "reliable and respected."

Plaintiff had

testified at deposition that the individual did not have the
[kauthority to bind the Hogles.
13.

Plaintiff did not, in his answers to defendants'

Interrogatories, identify or supply any documents which in any
way relate to plaintiffs' claim that the defendants had made
fraudulent misrepresentations.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT
MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST DEFENDANTS JAMES AND OWEN

!

HOGLE.
Plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges that as a
result of defendants' "careless and/ or negligent" false misrepresentations the parties entered into an agreement.

In order to

prevail plaintiff must prove all of the elements of fraud.
Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah, 1980).

These essen-

tial elements of fraud were set forth by the court in Conder v.
A. L. Williams & Assoc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987):
"(1) that a representation was made (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact
(3) which was false (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made

- 5recklessly knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity (7)
did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby
induced to act (9) to his injury and damage.11
Id at page 637.
Defendants Jones and Owen Hogle are entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action.

Plaintiffs' own

testimony demonstrate there are no genuine dispute as to three
of the above stated essential elements.
A.

The Hogles Did Not Misrepresent Facts to the Plain-

tiffs.
The plaintiffs must first prove that the defendants
caused false representations to be made to the plaintiffs.
According to plaintiff's deposition testimony and answers to
Interrogatories, neither of the Hogles made representations
which induced the plaintiffs to enter into the agreement.
Representations were made by an individual named Steven Brown
and other "contacts".
other "contacts".

The plaintiffs do not identify these

Plaintiff's testimony at deposition was that

Steven Brown did not have the authority to bind the Hogles.
B.

The Plaintiffs Did Not Rely On Representations Of

The Hogles In Entering Into The Agreement.
To prevail at trial the plaintiffs must prove reliance
upon the defendants' representations in entering the agreement.

- 6In subsection A above, defendants have shown that the Hogles did
not misrepresent facts to the plaintiffs.
rely on statements that were never made.

It is not possible to
The plaintiffs cannot

claim reliance on statements of the Hogles which the plaintiffs
have admitted do not exist.

Similar to the case at hand is

Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624 (Utah, 1960).

In Dupler, the

plaintiff had purchased the defendant's interest in oil wells.
The plaintiff claimed that he had been induced to purchase these
oil wells by the defendant's false representations.

The Supreme

Court of Utah affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant!s
motion for summary judgment.

The court based its decision on

the fact that the plaintiff, in agreeing to buy the defendant's
oil interests, had relied on representations made by individuals
other than the defendant:
"As a matter of law it is conceivable that a
person might simultaneously rely on misrepresentations of divergent defendants.
However, standing alone admissions by
plaintiffs that they relied on others is
sufficient proof to negative reliance on the
present defendant." Id at page 636.
In the instant

case,

as in Dupler, the plaintiffs have

indicated that they relied on representations of others in
entering into the agreement.

Reliance on others negates reli-

ance on the Hogles.
C.

There Is No Genuine Issue That The Hogles Acted

Knowingly Or Recklessly.

- 7The plaintiffs must prove that the false representations
made by the Hogles were made knowingly and recklessly.

In the

subsections above, the Hogles argue that the evidence clearly
shows that the Hogles did not make any representations to the
plaintiffs which the plaintiffs then relied on in reaching an
agreement with the defendants. Assuming arguendo that the Court
finds that the Hogles did make misrepresentations to the
plaintiffs, summary judgment is still proper as there is no
genuine issue that the Hogles acted knowingly and/or recklessly
in making representations.

As was stated by the court in

Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978)
"If the circumstances are such that the defendant could exercise extraordinary influence
over the plaintiff and the defendant was or
should have been aware the plaintiff reposed
trust and confidence in the defendant and
reasonably relied on defendant's guidance, then
the parties are said to be "in confidential
relationship" . . . There are few relationships
(such as parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui) which the law presumes to be confidential. Id. at 302.
As is set

forth in the plaintiff's deposition, there is

no question that the relationship between the plaintiffs and the
Hogles did not rise to the level of a confidential relationship.
There is no evidence which would suggest anything other than an
arm's length transaction between the parties.

The evidence

indicates that the Hogles did not act knowingly or recklessly.
In his deposition the plaintiff was asked a number of times what

- 8evidence he had to support a claim that the Hogles had knowingly
made false statements.

Repeatedly the plaintiffs were unable to

present any evidence or testimony that by any stretch of the
imagination would tend to demonstrate that the Hogles had
knowingly and/or recklessly made false statements.

Similarly,

in their answer to Interrogatory No. 6 in which plaintiffs were
asked to state each and every fact which supports their claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiffs did not even
attempt to set forth facts which would indicate that the Hogles
knowingly or recklessly made false statements.

The plaintiffs

in their Amended Complaint allege that the defendants acted
"carelessly and/or negligently."

Not only have the plaintiffs

failed to produce a shred of evidence that the defendants acted
knowingly or recklessly, but the plaintiffs do not even allege
this essential element.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.
Rule 9B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares

that " . . . fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity
. . . ."

Plaintiffs1 second cause of action does not approach

the standard contemplated by Rule 9B.
defendants in this action.

There are over five

It is not possible to tell from the

complaint which misrepresentations are attributed to which
defendant.

Plaintiffs have also failed to plead two of the

- 9essential elements of fraud; that the plaintiffs were induced by
false representations made by the Hogles and that the Hogles
knowingly or recklessly made false statements.

Further, the

alleged misrepresentations in the complaint did not satisfy the
requirement that the misrepresentations be of a presently
existing material fact,
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs? Second Cause of Action in the Amended
Complaint alleges fraudulent misrepresentations.

In an action

for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiffs must prove nine
essential elements.

Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment

as there are no factual disputes on three essential elements.
First, there is no question, based on the evidence presented by
the plaintiff, Walter Larson, that the Hogles did not misrepresent facts to the plaintiff.

Secondly, as the Hogles did not

misrepresent facts to the plaintiffs, there can be no question
that the plaintiffs did not rely on representations of the
Hogles in entering into agreements with the Hogles.

Finally, at

the deposition and in plaintiffs1 Answers to Defendants1 Interrogatories, plaintiffs fail to present a shred of evidence that
the Hogles knowingly and/or recklessly made false representations to the plaintiffs.
In the motion before the court, the Hogles seek the
alternative relief of a dismissal of plaintiffs1 Second Cause of

- 10 Action.

The procedural rules require that fraud be pleaded with

particularly.

At the very least, this requirement demands that

all of the elements of fraud be set forth in the Complaint.

The

Second Cause of Action of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is
deficient.

The plaintiffs fail to plead two essential elements.

Plaintiffs fail to allege that the plaintiffs were induced by
false representations made by the Hogles and that the Hogles
knowingly or recklessly made false statements.
Another essential element of fraud is that the misrepresentation must be of a fact that existed at the time the
representation was made.
fails in this respect.

The plaintiff's Amended Complaint also

The representations set forth by the

plaintiffs in their Second Cause of Action refer to promises to
perform in the future.

These allegations seem to be more suited

to a claim for breach of contract.

These allegations do not

make for a proper claim of fraud.
Dated this

day of August, 1988.

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

By
Harry Caston
Attorneys for Defendants
James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C.
Hogle
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ADDENDUM E

WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN (3267)
HARRY CASTON (4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr,
and Owen C. Hogle
i 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
!

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

i

WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON
and JOHN LARSON,
Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants .

REPLY POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS
JAMES AND OWEN HOGLE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.f

Civil No. C83-5542

Defendants and CounterClaimants .

Judge Richard H. Moffat

FACTS
1.

The Affidavit tendered by plaintiff Walter Park

Larson in opposition to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
disputes that defendants Gay and Bruno were the agents of
defendants James and Owen Hogle.
2.

The Affidavit tendered by plaintiff Walter Park

Larson does not dispute the facts that:

- 2 (a)

The obligation of the parties did not arise

until Larson Ford Sales had obtained Bankruptcy Court
approval of its Plan of Reorganization.
(b) That there was no breach of contract.
(c)

That the defendants are entitled to sanctions

under Rule 11 as the allegations of the defendants1
Amended Complaint are utterly false.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The quote set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum from State
v. Bonnett, 201 P.2d 939, fits squarely with the cases cited by
the defendants in their Points and Authorities.

As the contract

in the instant case clearly indicates that the plaintiffs
intended to deal only with defendants Bruno and Gay, the plaintiffs cannot subsequently claim that defendants James and Owen
Hogle were parties to the contract.

It is clear from the form

of the contract that the plaintiffs were dealing with defendants
Bruno and Gay in their individual capacity and on behalf of
HBGH, a Utah corporation.

- 3 POINT II
SHOULD THE COURT DETERMINE THAT DEFENDANTS OWEN AND JAMES
HOGLE WERE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT OF MARCH 5, 1983,
DEFENDANTS ARE STILL ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants Owen and James Hoglefs Motion for Summary
Judgment does not rest upon whether or not the Hogles were
parties to the contract of March 5, 1983.

In support of their

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Hogles have set forth evidence
which shows that the obligation of the defendants was subject to
an unfulfilled condition, and further that there was no breach
of contract.

The plaintiffs have produced no evidence to

dispute these allegations.

As there are no disputes as to the

material facts, defendants James and Owen Hogle are entitled to
a Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs may not escape the application of the
parol evidence rule.

It is clear that the plaintiffs were

dealing only with defendants Gay and Bruno individually and as
agents of HBGH.

However, should the court determine that the

Hogles were parties to the contract, the Hogles are still
entitled to their Motion for Summary Judgment as there is no
dispute as to any of the remaining material facts.

- 4 Dated this ZJC/

day of October, 1988.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Attorneys for Defendants
James and Owen Hogle
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I» the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 0?J?£/ day
of October, 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
JOHN J. BORSOS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
807 East South Temple, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Mr. Dennis W. Gay
780 West 889 South
Payson, Utah 84651
Stanley Adams, Esq.
Attorney for Stephen P. Bruno
521 Sixth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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ADDENDUM F

HARRY CASTON (4009)
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen C. Hogle
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WALTER P. LARSON,
SYBIL LARSON and
JOHN LARSON,
Plaintiffs and
Counter-Defendants,

Civil No. C83-5542
v.
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants and
Counter-Claimants,

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

On

or

about

July

1,

1983, plaintiffs

filed

their

Complaint.
2.

The Complaint contained two causes of action. The first

cause of action alleged breach of contract.

The second cause of

action sought relief based on "carelessly and/or negligently made
false representations made by the defendants".
3.

The defendants' first motion sought a dismissal of the

second cause of action or, in the alternative, for a more definite
statement as the plaintiffs had failed to properly plead the

2
elements of fraud as required by Rule 9B of -the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure•
4.

On May 29, 1984f this Court granted defendants7 motion

for a more definite statement and allowed the plaintiffs 10 days to
amend their complaint.
5.

Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint within the time

provided by the court.
6.

As did the original complaint,

the amended

complaint

contained causes of action for breach of the contract known as the
"Agreement and Escrow" and for "carelessly and/or negligently made
false representations".
7.

The Hogles moved the Court for partial summary judgment

on the cause of action for carelessly and/or negligently made false
misrepresentations.

The

points

presented

in

the

supporting

memorandum were that:
(a)

the

Hogles

did

not

misrepresent

facts

to

the

plaintiffs;
(b)

the plaintiffs did not rely on representations of
the

Hogles

in

entering

into

the

agreement

and

escrow;

8.

(c)

the Hogles did not act knowingly and recklessly; and

(d)

the plaintiffs had not pled fraud with specificity.

On August 26, 1988 the Court granted the Hogles' Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment.
9.

The Hogles then moved the Court for summary judgment on

the remaining cause of action, breach of contract. The Points and

3
Authorities in Support of that motion proved to the Court that,
based on the plaintiffs' own testimony and documents:
(a)

the Hogles never entered into a contract with the
plaintiffs;

(b)

even

if

the

plaintiffs,

Hogles
the

had

contracted

defendants7

with

obligations

the
were

subject to an unfulfilled condition precedent and
that the amendment to the contract provided that
the purchasers could "cease active pursuit of the
plan of reorganization of Larson Ford, Inc."; and
(c)
10.

in fact the contract had not been breached.

On October 7, 1988, ruling from the bench, the Court

granted the Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
11.

The plaintiff then claimed that there was a new theory

that plaintiffs7 previous counsel had failed to advance.

This new

theory was that the Hogles were part of a scheme to defraud the
plaintiff.
Wade.

This theory held that the Hogles conspired with Stephen

The plan was that the Hogles would deplete the plaintiffs'

business assets which would then allow Stephen Wade to purchase the
assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced price.
12.
Amended

The Court granted the plaintiffs' Motion to File an
Complaint

to allow the plaintiffs

to pursue

this

new

theory.
13.

The plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (which should properly

be denominated Second Amended Complaint) contains three causes of
action.

The first two causes of action are the same as were

4
contained in the original Complaint and r the plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint.

These causes of action are breach of the

contract dated March 5, 1983, and negligent misrepresentation. The
third cause of action alleges fraud.

This new cause of action is

where the plaintiff alleges that the Hogles acted in collusion with
Stephen Wade to deplete Larson Ford's assets which would then allow
Wade to purchase the entity at a reduced price.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND
CARELESSLY AND/OR NEGLIGENTLY MADE FALSE MISREPRESENTATIONS
HAVE BEEN LITIGATED AND DISMISSED BY THE COURT.
The
Judgment.
the

defendant

previously

filed

two Motions

for

Summary

The first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment addressed

plaintiffs'

claim

misrepresentations.

of

carelessly

made

and/or

false

The Court granted this motion and dismissed

that cause of action.

The defendants then moved the Court for

summary judgment on the cause of action for breach of contract.
The Court granted this motion as well.

After granting

the

defendants' second motion, the plaintiff pled with the Court to
allow the plaintiff to pursue a cause of action that had not been
presented to the Court due to the fumbling of the plaintiffs'
previous counsel. This new theory was that the Hogles had colluded
with Stephen Wade to drive down the value of Larson Ford.

The

Court allowed the defendant to file an Amended Complaint to pursue
this new theory.

The plaintiffs' new complaint included this new

cause of action. The new complaint also included causes of action

5
for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation - the same
exact causes of action that were previously dismissed by the Court.
The defendant contends that the Court's dismissal of the
causes of action for breach of contract and negligent and/or
careless misrepresentation became the law of this case.
issues have been litigated by the parties.

These

These matters were

fully briefed and argued. In presenting these issues to the Court,
the plaintiff had the extremely competent assistance of his present
attorney. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court determined that
the applicable case law required dismissal of the causes of action
of

breach

of

contract

misrepresentations.

and

negligent

and/or

These issues are now res judicata.

careless
If the

plaintiff disagrees with the Court's dismissal, the plaintiff has
the right to appeal.

The plaintiff does not have the right to

include issues that have been litigated and dismissed.

Should

the Court disagree with the defendant on the issue of res judicata,
the defendant incorporates the defendant's previous Motions for
Summary Judgment within this memorandum.

The defendant will be

prepared to discuss these issues with the Court at the hearing
which is scheduled for June 12, 1992.
POINT TWO; THE PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD SHOULD
BE DISMISSED.
A.

The Plaintiffs' Own Deposition Testimony Proves There Was
No Collusion Between Stephen Wade and the Hogles.

The Court granted the plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended
Complaint to allow the plaintiff to pursue the theory that the
Hogles acted

in collusion with

Stephen Wade to defraud

the

6
plaintiff.

The plaintiffs7 theory is that the Hogles and other

defendants would deplete the plaintiff's business assets. Stephen
Wade would then purchase the assets of Larson Ford at a greatly
reduced

price.

On

page

23

of

the

Defendants7

Points

and

Authorities in Support of Defendant Hogle's Motion for Summary
Judgment, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, the
defendants set forth the deposition testimony of plaintiff Park
Larson.

As the defendant

asks that

the

Court

review

that

memorandum, the defendant will not burden the Court by repeating in
full the

arguments

contained

therein

plaintiff's deposition testimony.

or the

excerpt

of the

The defendant will repeat the

crucial observation that at the deposition the plaintiff was given
an opportunity to set forth any evidence he had that there was
collusion between Stephen Wade and any of the defendants.

The

plaintiff's own sworn testimony demonstrates that there was no
fraud and/or collusion.
B.

The Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories Fail to
Demonstrate Any Collusion Between the Hogles and Stephen
Wade.

In Interrogatory Number 4 of the defendant's Interrogatories
and Request for Production of Documents dated January 28, 1992, the
defendant sought to discover the factual basis upon which the
plaintiff based his claim that the defendants and Stephen Wade had
a plan to deplete the plaintiff's resources so as to allow Stephen
Wade to purchase the assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced
price.

A copy of plaintiff's answers signed on May 19, 1992 are

attached hereto as Exhibit B.

As did the plaintiff's deposition

7
testimony, the answer to Interrogatory Number 4 demonstrates that
there was no collusion between the Hogles and Stephen Wade.

The

foundation upon which the plaintiff7s claim rests is that the
Hogles had approached the plaintiff to purchase Larson Ford.

The

plaintiff's own previous testimony was that he was not approached
by the Hogles but by a third party who the plaintiff admitted had
no authority to speak for or to bind the Hogles.

The contention

that the Hogles had made statements to the plaintiff also must
fail.
rule

This Court has previously ruled that the parole evidence
prevents

the

plaintiff

from

claiming

that

there

were

statements and representations outside of the contract as the
contract and its amendments completely set forth the agreement
between the parties. The Court has also previously ruled that the
Hogles were not parties to any of the contracts. As was stated in
the Affidavit of Owen Hogle, the Hogles7 relationship to the sale
of Larson Ford was that they were funding the corporation that was
purchasing Larson Ford.
C.

The Plaintiff's Complaint Should Be Dismissed For Failure
to Include an Indispensable Party.

Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure holds that
"a person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already
parties..."
In the instant case the plaintiff claims that Stephen Wade acted in
collusion with the defendants in order to defraud the plaintiff.
If what the plaintiff says is true, Stephen Wade would then be

8
responsible for a portion of the plaintiffs damages, if any.

If

Stephen Wade were not made a party, the Hogles would then be
responsible for Stephen Wade's share of these alleged damages. It
is for this reason that Stephen Wade is an indispensable party.
Section 78:12-26(3) of the Utah Code sets forth a three year
statute of limitations on fraud. As Stephen Wade, an indispensable
party,

cannot

be made

a

defendant

the

complaint

should

be

dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The defendants previously sought and obtained summary judgment
on the causes of action for breach of contract and negligent and/or
carelessly made misrepresentations. Following the Court's granting
of the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff
requested that he be allowed to file an amended complaint to state
a new cause of action.

This cause of action was based upon the

theory that the Hogles had conspired with Stephen Wade. The theory
held that the Hogles really never intended to purchase the assets
of Larson Ford; all along, the Hogles intended to run Larson Ford
into the ground.

Their co-conspirator, Stephen Wade, would then

purchase the assets of Larson Ford at a greatly reduced price.
The Court allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint to
include this new cause of action.

The problem

is that the

plaintiff's new complaint included the causes of action that had
previously been dismissed.

There are procedural remedies that

could have been sought to obtain relief from the Court's ruling on
the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.

These remedies

9
include those provided by Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The plaintiff did not seek such relief. The plaintiff
did not at any time ask the Court to set aside the ruling on the
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court dismissed the causes of action for breach of
contract and negligent and/or carelessly made misrepresentations
based upon the plaintiff's own testimony.

During the deposition

and during the briefing period as well as at oral argument, the
plaintiff was represented by his present counsel. As these actions
were dismissed, there is no reason why they should be included in
the plaintiff's present complaint.
The new cause of action should also be dismissed.

This cause

of action alleges that the Hogles depleted the assets of Larson
Ford so that Stephen Wade could buy the remainder at a reduced
price.

The plaintiff has been asked on two occasions to produce

whatever evidence he has to prove fraud and/or collusion between
the Hogles and Stephen Wade. In his own deposition, the plaintiff
offered a hearsay statement which does not include any evidence of
fraud or collusion.

In responding to Interrogatory Number 4, the

plaintiff commenced by stating that the Hogles had approached him
with an offer to buy the business, and how the Hogles had made
statements and promises.

The plaintiff had previously testified

that the Hogles did not approach him to purchase Larson Ford. The
Court previously noted that the Hogles were not parties to any of
the contracts, and further, that the purchasers had the right to no
longer pursue the purchase of Larson Ford. There is another reason

10
why the plaintiff's action for fraud should be dismissed.
plaintiff alleges that Stephen Wade was a co-conspirator.

The

In this

regard, he would also be responsible for the plaintiff's damages.
As the three year statute of limitations for fraud has expired,
this indispensable party cannot be brought into this lawsuit.
DATED this S?6~/A

day of May, 1992.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

By:

//

/Sjc^fc
rry Caston
:orneys for Defendants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
of May, 1992, true and
correct copies of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
John J. Borsos
370 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hans M. Scheffler
311 South State, #380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM G

SEP
WILLIAM THOMAS THURMAN
(3267)
HARRY CASTON
(4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen C. Hogle
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135

2? 2 10 PK e8B
bcr'JTy &,€«*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON
and JOHN LARSON,
Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants .

AFFIDAVIT OF OWEN HOGLE

vs.
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.,
Defendants and CounterClaimants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Civil No. C83-5542

Judge Richard H. Moffat

)
) ss.
)

Affiant being first duly sworn deposes and states:
1.

That from March 21, 1983, HBGH supplied in excess of

$150,000.00 to Larson Ford Sales.
2.

The Hogles were never the assigns of Bruno and Gay.

3.

That defendants James and Owen Hogle were not and

have never been officers, directors or shareholders or HBGH.

n D c 9 r; o

4.

HBGH became a corporation on March 22, 1983,

Dated this /#$

day of September, 1988.

wen C. Hog^
Hogle /^y
Owen
Subscribed and sworn to before me

this /9-

day of

September, 1988.

Notary Public/
My commission expires:

Residing at:

HC06/17
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ADDENDUM H

A

Mr. Stephen Brown told us that, Mr. Gary Routh

told us that, Mr. Bruno told us that, and Mr. Gay told us
that.
• Q

That it was to be a corporation?

A

Right.

Q

And you were dealing with H.B.G.H. as an intended

corporation; is that right?
A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

Q

I think you have to speak a u d i b l y .

A

Yes.

Q

Can you show me anywhere in there where the

Hogles signed—and. there are some other documents,
Mrs. Larson, that you didn't look a t —

I will contend

that these documents are fairly the same, but I would ask
you to go through them.

These are the ones that were

supplied to me by yourself as being the plaintiff in this
matter.
A

On page 5 of 45, it says "H.CB.H."

Q

Incorporated?

A

Yes.

MR. BORSOS:

Let the record show that she is pointing

to Exhibit 4 of the deposition of Park Larson on the last
page, page 5, and that she is referring to the letters
"H.B.G.H.," without any words "intended corporation."
THE WITNESS:

This agreement says "H.G.B.H."

Not

1^
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84070

im\) 571-0769

ADDENDUM I

1

backer or —

2

Q

3
4

Could you have devised a plan that, perhaps, the

parties could agree upon?
A

No.

I had — We'd already agreed on what the plan

5

was going to be under our agreement.

6

was unacceptable.

7
8
9
10

Anything less than that

At that point in time, the Hogles couldn't perform,
or wouldn't, and didn't.
Q

You claim, do you not, that the defendants made

fraudulent misrepresentations; isn't that correct?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

What were those fraudulent misrepresentations?

13

A

Well, very clearly the fact that they were going to

14

be able to perform and meet the requirements of the agreement

15

that we'd —

16

Q

Is that all of the fraudulent misrepresentations?

17

A

I think that it's -- All the fraudulent

that we'd agreed upon for a plan.

18

misrepresentations at this point as I think about it would be

19

involved with their failure to perform on the basis of the

20

agreement that we'd drawn up, which was the requirements that

21

I had set for me to relinquish my position and ownership of

22

the business, giving up my stock to the Hogles so that they

23

could become my successor as debtor-in-possession.

24
25

Q

Please correct me if I'm mischaracterizing what

you're telling me, but, basically, the fraudulent

Certified Shorthand Reporters

K1

1

misrepresentations which they made to you were what they were

2

going to do to fund your plan; is that correct?

3

claim?

4

1

A

I think that —

that plus their —

Is that your

their failure to

5

be able to inject funds into the business on the schedule

6

which they had told me they would.

7

though not directly associated with the plan itself.

8
9
10

Q

That would be a part of it

When they made you these, what you claim to be,

false representations, you claim the defendants knew they were
false when they were made?

11

A

I can't second-guess what they thought.

12

Q

Do you have any evidence upon which to base a

13

belief that the defendants when they made these statements

14

which you believe are false misstatements knew they were false

15

when they made them?

16

HR. PACE:

17
18
19
20

Excuse me a minute, Counsel.

Just give me a

minute.
MR. CASTON:

Let the record reflect that he's consulting

with the witness.
MR. PACE: You may show that I'm consulting him.

21

(Discussion held off the record between the

22

witness and his counsel.)

23

THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that question again.

24

Q

25

(By Mr. Caston)

Certainly.

You've told me there were certain things which the
c

}^buQanl^xial(S

Certified Shorthand Reporters
CO

1

defendants told you which, more or less, were not true. And

2

these are —

3

A

4
5

Well, they never materialized, they didn't ever

come to pass.
Q

You claim

6
7

And you can go through your amended complaint, if
you like, so you don't have to take my word for it.

8
9
10
11
12

—

—

and please correct me if I'm wrong —

defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations to you.
MR. PACE: You want him to confirm what's in the
complaint?

Is that your question?

MR. CASTON:

Yes.

Not only the complaint, but I also

13

want to know if he feels that they made fraudulent

14

misrepresentations.

15

that the

THE WITNESS: Well, the representations that were made to

16

me were that the Hogle group, as Steve Brown said, had the

17

bucks, had the intense desire to own, operate and manage

18

Larson Ford Sales, Inc., that they had extensive collateral

19

that would be used to substitute for S.B.A. collateral that I

20

had provided personally, that they were fully capable and able

21

to financially follow through with the plan that we agreed

22

upon.

23

Mr. Brown initially but later on by Mr. Bruno.

24
25

Q

Those representations was made to me by — not only by

(By Mr. Caston)

But Mr. Brown didn't have the

authority to bind the Hogles; isn't that correct?

Certified Shorthand Reporters

M

document here.
Q

(By Mr. Caston)

Before we proceed in another

direction, let me bring back to your attention that before we
went on the break I told you that I was going to ask questions
regarding what you believe to be specific misrepresentations
that the defendants made to you.

Is that pretty much what

happened?
A

Yes.

Q

And I gave you a copy of the amended complaint, and

I told you that those were what you allege to be the specific
misrepresentations which you claim the defendants made to you.

not?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

And they are, in fact, contained in there, are they

When I say "in there," I'm referring to the paragraph of

the amended complaint
A

—

Shall we be specific as to some of these items,

such as paragraph 9 under the Second Cause Of Action
Q

Sure.

A

—

—

which you've underlined, I believe; maybe those

are your marks, they are not mine:
"Defendants carelessly and/or negligently
made false representations that they could and
would perform the conditions described in the
agreements between the parties."
They have definitely made some assurance to me and

*]<{M&6urfQnfTfl&KiaW

C^edShorthw* Reporter*
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1

to my wife.

2

Q

What was that that they told you?

3

A

That they could and would perform the conditions

4

described in the agreements between the parties, that they

5

would assume the debt, that they would get

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Q

—

Do you have any information on which to base a

belief that that statement was false when it was made?
A

I'm —

I have to assume that it was.

Because they

didn't follow through with it, it had to be.
Q

Do you have any evidence on which to base that

belief?
A

I was very suspicious that Mr. Hogle was not

present during the negotiations.
Q

That's the only evidence you have to base the

belief that that statement was false?

16

A

Not necessarily.

17

Q

What evidence do you have?

18

A

The fact that when we got down to the final

19

negotiating stage necessary in meeting, that I would have

20

liked, as I said, to have had Mr. Hogle there.

21

I was concerned that Owen C. Hogle's brother, James

22

Junior, who I had been assured all along was a party to the

23

agreement

—

24

Q

Who assured you?

25

A

Mr. Bruno on a number of occasions, Dennis Gay, the

Certified Shorthand Reporters
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1

demonstrations to Plaintiffs through August

2

of 1983 at no cost, to allow Plaintiffs to

3

purchase trucks or cars at invoice price, to

4

to take on up to $2,100,000.00 liabilities of

5

the dealership."

6
7
8
9

I want to know every fact upon which you base that
those statements were false when they were made.
A

My hesitancy in answering the question is —

is

merely to try and recall items that I don't have in my

10

possession right now, Counsel.

11

have any notes, I don't have any documents of any kind in

12

front of me.

13
14
15

Q

I don't have any of —

So at this time you have no evidence on which to

base a belief that —
A

Not with me.

I don't have anything here which I

16

would proffer to you or show to you or refer to to be

17

specific.

18
19

I don't

Q

What kind of things would you refer to to show that

what the defendants said was false?

What type of documents?

20

A

I can't be specific on that, either.

21

Q

Would you take it upon yourself to review those

22

documents and present them to me as the documents which you

23

believe support your claim as to what the defendants did, that

24

the defendants lied to you?

25

MR. PACE: Sure.

Certified Shorthand Reporters
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THE WITNESS:

Yes, I would.

Anything that I have, I'll —

I'll locate.
MR. PACE: Yes.
Q

(By Mr. Caston)

Did you rely on these statements?

A

I relied on the statements made by the defendants,

very definitely.
Q

How is it you relied on them?

A

They were given to me as an absolute assurance, the

final discussion at 2 o'clock that Saturday morning —

that

—

that Sunday morning.
In fact, I recall specifically my wife telling
Mr. Bruno that we were under a certain degree of duress here
timewise, "Hammered out this agreement with you, there are
other people that we've been working with, we are turning this
matter now over to you to meet the requirements which have
been agreed upon and what are we going to do and what happens
to us if you don't perform?"
Mr. Bruno specifically stated — Well, he said,
"We're going to perform."
And when my wife expressed her concern again, he
said, "And if we don't, you can sue us."
We were told at that time that unless we eliminated
all uncertainties in the agreement before that meeting was
concluded, if we did not iron out all the details, that
Mr. Hogle and, I assume, Bruno and Gay or whoever among their
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1

A

Correct.

2

Q

Do you have any recollection of whom was present

3

when you were told that the Hogles were colluding with Stephen

4

Wade?

5

A

No.

6

Q

Do you recall what exactly it was that they told

A

As I recall, the essence of the information that I

7

you?

8

i

9

got was that Wades and the Hogles had been in contact with

10

each other with the idea that was discussed being the fact

11

that Wade had an inside track of some kind with Ford that they

12

would be approved as the dealer, that if the Hogle group .

13

wanted to protect the investment that they'd made in the

14

dealership to that point in time, in order to have the

15

cooperation of the Wades, were —

16

getting a creditors' plan accepted, if the Hogle group wanted

17

to get their money out that they would withdraw.

18
19

Q

Do you have any knowledge as to when you were told

A

No, I donft.

this?

20
21
22

were they successful in

Q
Do you have any document which would reference when
you were told this?

23

A

That I don't —

I don't know.

24

notes left from meetings and —

25

were

I do have a lot of

and memos that I made that

—

"J^bu^andJiMialeSCertified Shorthand Reporters
13

ADDENDUM L

INTERROGATORY
defendants were involved
planned

to

individual

deplete
in

4:

Regarding

your

in a scheme in which the

plaintiffs' resources

collusion

belief

with

the

after

defendants

that

the

defendants

which
would

another
purchase

plaintiff's assets at a greatly reduced price, please state:
(a) each and every fact upon which you base your belief;
(b) the title, location and individual in possession of
each document which supports your belief.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 4:
approached

In January, 1983, the hogles

plaintiff to buy his business.

Plaintiff

had

had

several offers from various prospective purchasers, including his
neighbor,

Stephen

Wade.

The

Hogles

made

many

promises

and

statements (upon which plaintiffs' relied) to plaintiff which are
the subject of this lawsuit. One particular crucial element in all
negotiations was the deadline in Bankruptcy Court for plaintiff to
submit a plan to creditors—March 21, 1983, This date was known to
all defendants and it was this date by which plaintiff had to
submit a plan in Bankruptcy for approval of the creditors.

The

Hogles, despite the recommendations of an auditor, said they would
purchase the dealership and agreed to various provisions that would
have to satisfy the creditors of the dealership. The Hogles agreed
to substitute collateral, to get approval of Ford Motor Credit, and
to pledge their personal wealth, reputation and effort to meeting

5

the deadline so they could purchase the business. The Bogles took
over

the

dealership

and

began

several

questionable

business

practices of hiring and firing employees, having an apparent HGoing
out of Business Sale", and not paying the heat bill so that
utilities were turned off for several days.

These business

practices caused the business to lose approximately $150,000.00.
Prior to the bankruptcy deadline, Stephen Wade and other
potential buyers, continued to request that the plaintiffs sell the
dealership to them.

Plaintiffs refused these reports because of

their March 5th, 1983 Agreement with the defendants.

Plaintiffs

had taken Owen Hogle around to the various creditors to fulfill the
March 5, 1983 agreement and had urged Owen Bogle to contact the
other creditors of the dealership. Plaintiffs became worried as the
deadline approached and the defendants had not attempted to fulfil
their promises or their obligations under the Agreements signed by
them.

After meetings with plaintiff1 s bankruptcy

attorney,

defendants refused to abide by the terms of their agreements and
decided not to purchase the dealership.

On March 22, defendants

finally incorporated BBGB. Then BBGB entered into an agreement to
reimburse Owen Bogle for the money he had invested into the
dealership.

On or about March 22, 1983, the defendants made

plaintiffs a —take it or leave it—offer to rescind the March 5th
Agreement.

The defendants did submit an inadequate plan to the

6

Bankruptcy Court. Stephen Wade again made an offer the plaintiffs
to buy the dealership but he too would not satisfy creditors of the
dealership.

Plaintiffs having surrendered the operation of the dealership
to the Hogles and having relied upon the Hogles to comply with the
March 5th agreement, were under severe duress to continue working
with the defendants.

Plaintiffs submitted the defendant's terms

for payment as their plan.

Stephen Wade submitted a plan because

he was a $130.00 creditor owed by plaintiff's bankrupt corporation.
Wade's plan made better provision

for payment

creditors than did defendant's inspired plan.

of the major

Walter P. Larson

told defendants that they would not succeed in this bankruptcy
proceeding unless the defendants satisfied the creditors and those
voting for the plans. Defendants amended their plan once and then
withdrew their support entirely leaving only the Wade plan. After
their withdrawal and support of the Wade plan, the defendants

—

unlike other creditors-- received back from Wade and the Bankruptcy
court all of monies they had invested in the dealership and
defendant's attorneys received back the fees charged defendants,
even though their interest was not stated in either of the
competing Bankruptcy plans.

7

Plaintiffs have learned that the scenario of the their case
patterns the scenario of several other ventures entered into by the
defendants. Plaintiffs believe that the Hogles have a history of
real estate dealings with Bruno. Bruno, who has been involved with
several real estate ventures with defendants Hogle, was charged and
convicted of felony HUD violations using a "strawman scheme" (Utah
Federal District Court # CR85-00135S).

In November, 1984 Gay and

James Hogle (a purported silent investor) petitioned the court in
DSR Southern Development Inc v Stephen Bruno. Utah State Third
Distract Court Number C87-6053, to stop Bruno's interference with
properties that all of them had owned together and to protect James
Hogle Jr's unrecorded interest based on his personal guarantees.
A default judgment for $1,125,000 was entered against Bruno, who
was represented by William Thurman, a partner of the firm now
representing the hogles in this case.
(b)

Attorney, John J. Borsos, 370 East South Temple,

Suite #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
INTERROGATORY 5:

Please state with specificity the

damages you claim you suffered as a result of the defendant's
actions together with the dollar amount which you are claiming for
each element of damage.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 5:

Defendants agreed to pay

plaintiffs $175,000.00 of the purchase of the dealership.

8
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ADDENDUM M

JOHN J. BORSOS 384
Attorney for Plaintiffs
807 East South Temple, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 533-8883
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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WALTER P. LARSON and SYBIL LARSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEPHEN P, BRUNO, DENNIS W. GAY,
JAMES HOGLE, JR., and OWEN C. HOGLE,
as individuals; HBGH INC. PARTNERSHIP}
and, as partners,
Defendants.

t
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AFFIDAVIT OF
WALTER P. LARSON

I
I
i
i
t

Civil No. C-83-SS42

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

_L

State of California
County'of San Diego

}

j8$

COMES NOW Walter P. Larson, Plaintiff 1n the above-entitled action, and
having been duly sworn and deposed, states as follows:
1.

That he is the Plaintiff In the above-entitled action.

2.

That he has read the Notion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment

filed by Defendants James and Owen Hogle.
3.

That he was approached in early January of 1983 by Stephen P. Bruno

and Dennis Gay, who were later Identified as agents for Owen C. Hogle and
James Hogle, Jr., concerning the sale of Larson Ford Sales which was then 1n
a bankruptcy.
4.

That at all times during the negotiations for the sale of Larson

Ford Sales, Bruno and Gay represented that they were acting for and on behalf
of James Hogle, Jr., and Owen Hogle.

6.

That on January IS, 1983, he had a meeting with Defendants Bruno,

Gay and James Hogle. During that meeting, he was told by the Defendants that
the Individual defendants were all the principals of the earnest money offer
for the purchase of Larson Ford Sales.
6.

That in February, 1983, he personally led Defendants James and Owen

Hogle on a tour of the business premises of Larson Ford Sales. He took Owen
Hogle and James Hogle, along with Steven Brown and Gary Routh, on a tour of
the entire dealership, including the show-room floor, customer lounge,
offices and meeting rooms upstairs, parts department, service department,
body shop, and other parts storage areas, as well 6$ a walk through the
outside ground and property fence lines.
7.

That he found both James Hogle, Jr., and Owen C. Hogle to be very

Impressed. He answered all questions they had concerning the dealership and
was told by them that Mr. Bruno and Mr. Gay would be working with him on
details of the takeover of Larson Ford by the Hogles.
8.

That on February 17, 1983, he met with Defendants James Hogle,

Bruno and Gay for the purpose of extending the deadline set forth in the
February 4, 1983, agreement.
9.

That on February 18, 1983, the parties all agreed that the contin-

gencies contained In the February 4, 1983, agreement were Lo be removed by
February 25, 1983.
10. That later 1n February, 1983, a meeting was held at Larson Ford
Sales with the Plaintiff and Defendants Bruno and Owen Hogle. During this
meeting, said Defendants informed Plaintiff that their attorneys were
communicating with the Bankruptcy Court judge concerning a possible loan.
11. That the Hogles visited the dealership a number of other times, and
it was common knowledge that they were buying Larson Ford. This awareness
reached the point that, on one occasion, an employee reported to him that
2

James Hogle, Jr., had just been seen in a parked car across the street from
the dealership observing the dealership and watch1rig customers come and go.
12. That at 6very

meeting with Bruno and Steve Brown or Dennis Gay, Mr.

Bruno, who was the negotiator for the Hogles, always referred to the fact
that he was acting upon instruction of James Hogle and Owen Hogle and that he
was reporting progress directly to them.
13. That on March 2, 1983, a Finder's Fee Agreement was made and
entered into by Wardley Corporation and the individual Defendants. Pursuant
to this agreement, the Individual Defendants agreed to pay a finder's fee of
$75,000 for the purchase of Larson Ford Sales.
14. That 1n March, 1983, Jerry Christensen met with him and Defendants
Bruno, Gay and Owen Hogle at Larson Ford Sales. At this meeting, Larson was
informed that Mr. Christensen was to be the general manager and that he would
receive a salary from the Individual Defendants 1n the sum of $3,000.00 per
month plus a percentage of the profits.
15. That on March 5, 1983, an Agreement 1n Escrow was signed by HBGH,
Inc., an Intended corporation, and Walter Larson. The parties to that
agreement agreed to Incorporate the terms and conditions of the February 4,
1983, Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the addendum thereto.
16. That an amendment to the March 5, 1983, agreement modified the
terms of payment and the purchasers; l.e, the individual Defendants, agreed
to file a bankruptcy plan by March 20, 1983.
17. That on March 10, 1983, Randy Call, the bankruptcy attorney for
Larson Ford Sales, met with B i n Thurman, Defendant Bruno and Walter Larson
to discuss a lease with option to purchase the assets of Larson Ford Sales
and to discuss the plan for reorganization.

3

IS. That on March 11, 1983, following the Instructions of Defendant
Owen Hogle, Plaintiff Walter Larson deposited all outstanding shares of
Larson Ford Sales Into an escrow with Harold Stephens.
19. That on March 14, 1983, after Plaintiff Halter Larson had to inform
the employees of Larson Ford Sales that he had to terminate their employment,
Defendant Owen Hogle announced to all such employees that they were rehired.
From that day on, Defendant Owen Hogle took up residence in the offices of
Larson Ford Sales and assumed the responsibility for operating the
dealership.
20. That on March 18, 1983, Defendant Owen Hogle promised to obtain
operating funds for the business.
21. That on March 21, 1983, after the Individual Defendants had
threatened not to submit a plan in the Bankruptcy Court, an agreement was
signed by Plaintiff Walter Larson, HBGH, Inc., and Defendant Bruno. That
agreement provided that certain financing needed to be obtained.
22. That on March 22, 1983, a Disclosure Statement and Plan of Reorganization was filed In the Bankruptcy Court. On that date, Defendants
Bruno, Gay and Owen Kogle also agreed that all the money which Defendant Owen
Hogle would invest in Larson Ford Sales would be repaid at the interest rate
of 12 percent prior to any withdrawals. Furthermore, Defendant Owen Hogle
was to have access to all books and records of HBGH, Inc., and Larson Ford
Sales.

Furthermore, Defendant Owen Hogle was entitled to participate in all

management decisions and was to be consulted prior to any alteration or
action which materially affected either entity.
23. That on March 24, 1983, a First Amended Disclosure Statement was
filed 1n the Bankruptcy Court. In that disclosure statement, HBGH, Inc., was
represented as having been formed for the specific purpose of purchasing the
assets of Larson Ford Sales.
4

24. That Defendants Owen Hogle and Gay had agreed to specific funding
and financial backing of HBGH, Inc., in order to facilitate and properly fund
the purchase of Larson Ford Sales. Defendants Owen Hogle and Gay had also
. arranged for $300,000 cash, which was generated through assets other than
those of the debtor, Larson Ford Sales, to be used in funding the purchase.
25. That the disclosure statement was modified on April 21, 1983,
wherein investors were not limited to Defendants Owen Hogle and 6ay, but
would Include anonymous Investors who had alleged cash reserves available of
one-half mill ion dollars.
26. That Defendants Owen Hogle and Gay filed personal financial
statements with the Bankruptcy Court and resumes to accompany the disclosure
statements filed in the Bankruptcy Court.
27. That Defendants James and Owen Hogle made no effort to substitute
collateral to satisfy the debts of Larson Ford Sales.
28. That Defendants James and Owen Hogle did not vote for the Larson
Ford Sales Plan of Reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court.
29. That Defendant Owen Hogle operated and managed the business. In
fact, he held a "Going Out for Business Sale."
30. That Defendants failed to pay the utilities of the dealership in
March 1983.
31. That the Hogles themselves, through their actions, conduct, and
words, indicated the following facts to him;
a.

That they were intending to purchase Larson Ford Sales through

the Bankruptcy Court by supporting the Debtors Plan of Reorganization, which
they would co-draft with Larson Ford Sales law firm.
b.

That Owen Hogle would continue operating the dealership until

the Plan of Reorganization was approved and then he would operate all of his
business from Larson Ford Sales. He personally signed checks and handed
9

these to the employees. He performed all the functions of an owner so that
Walter Larson left the premises and let Owen Hogle operate as owner.
c.

That when organizing the business, Owen C, Hogle told Walter

Larson at the dealership with regard to Owen Hogle*s responsibility of
running the dealership and providing the necessary funds, "It is my responsibility, and I'll get the job done."
32. That at all times during the course of negotiations and after the
contracts were entered Into, his accountant was given instructions to fully
cooperate with Stephen Bruno, Dennis Gay, Owen C. Hogle and James Hogle. All
information available to Walter Larson was given to them regarding the
financial condition of the business and the activities of the business.
33. That in a meeting with the Hogle representatives on February 9,
1983, he was asked to make available to Hogles* CPA or auditor any and all
financial records held by Larson Ford at the dealership located at 5500 South
State Street that they asked to inspect.
34. That he agreed and complied with this request, with the understanding that the Hogles needed hands-on verification of financial information which he had been given by Mr. Paul Jones, Larson Ford*s treasurer and
comptroller* and had supplied to them,
35. That he informed Defendants Stephen P. Bruno, Dennis W. Gay and
Owen C. Hogle that he could not convey to them the franchise for Larson Ford
without the approval of the Ford Motor Company. However, he explained such
approval would have to be given 1f reasonable assurances could be given to
Ford Motor of the ability of the Hogles to operate the Ford dealership and if
the Hogles had proceeded, as they agreed, with Ford Motor Credit Company.
36. That the individual defendants breached their agreements to
purchase Larson Ford Sales by falling to negotiate substitute collateral
agreements with the various banks to which liability was owed, failing to
6

negotiate substitute guarantees with Ford Motor Credit Company, falling to
supply the needed capital to keep the utilities and other operations of the
business 1n working order, failing to purchase all of the assets of the
business, and failing to subsequently execute other agreements and fully
cooperate in executing those agreements to the degree necessary to fully
carry out the terms of the March 5, 1983, agreement.
37. That Just before the expiration of the exclusive period for him to
file his amended plan as a debtor in possession before the Bankruptcy Court,
the defendants failed to honor their obligations agreed to in the March 1983
agreement 1n order to submit a plan that would comply with acceptance of the
major creditors (to wit, the banks, the Small Business Administration and the
State Tax Commission}.
38. That the plan submitted on March 25, 1983, was objected to on April
11 by Citizens Bank and Commercial Security Bank and Ford Motor Company.
Both of the banks were to have been contacted by the Individual defendants,
and according to the February 4, 1983, agreement) the defendants were to
negotiate substitute collateral to accomplish the release of Walter Larson's
personal liability from these banks. Ford Motor Company, in its April 11
objection to approval of disclosure, stated that documentation by HBGH had
not been submitted; 1n particular, the names of the officers, directors, and
shareholders, experience of these people, financial information of the
corporation, the source and amount of available funds, pro forma financial
Information, and the steps that the corporation would use to get the necessary flooring and secure the new and used car inventory. The failure to
provide this information caused Ford Motor Company to object to the March
plan.

7

39.

That the defendants left the business and canceled the escrow and

the contract prior to June 10, 1983, the date confirmation of the Stephen
Wade plan occurred.
DATED this

IV

_<•
day of Jtttft

19fk

u)u&Z'
WALTER P. LARSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/£ day of < % * r ^

1992.

yu+J&i-

Notary Public

OFFICIAL SEAL

f *F^&.

NOTAIfir PUBLIC • CALIFORNIA
PRINCIPAL OFFICE M
S A N OIEGO COUNTY

My Commission Expires Decwnber 8. 1995
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HARRY CASTON (4009)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen C. Hogle
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WALTER P. LARSON and SYBIL
LARSON,
Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants ,

ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST
SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
TO DEFENDANTS JAMES HOGLE, JR.
AND OWEN C. HOGLE

vs.
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.

Civil No. C83-5542
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants and CounterClaimants.

Defendants, James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle, respond to
Plaintiffs1 First Set of Requests for Admissions to Defendants
James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle as follows:
1.

Admit that on January 15, 1983, James Hogle attended a

meeting with Dennis Gay, Steve Bruno, and Walter P. Larson.
ANSWER:
2.

Admitted.

Admit that during the January 15, 1983, meeting James

Hogle indicated that he was one of the wealthy individuals on whose

2
behalf was signed the January 13, 1990, Earnest Money Agreement to
purchase the assets and liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
3.

Denied.

Admit that in January or February, 1983 Walter P. Larson

gave a tour of the premises of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. to James
Hogle, Jr., Steven Brown, Owen C. Hogle and the Realtor from
Wardley Real Estate.
ANSWER:
4.

Admitted.

Admit that in January, 1983 you were interested in

purchasing Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Denied.

5. Admit that on January 13, 1983, an Earnest Money Offer was
made to Wardley Real Estate Company from Western Slope Development
which had been incorporated the day before to purchase Larson Ford
Sales, Inc. for a total purchase price of $150,000.00.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 5 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
6.
preceding

Admit that the Earnest Money Offer, referred to in the
request,

contained

certain

contingencies,

to-wit:

approval by Ford Motor Company of the franchise transfer, purchasers' inspection and approval of the property lease, assets of

3
the business, and inspection and approval of the findings of his
agent after inspection of the books and records of Larson Ford
Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No, 6 as

it calls for a legal conclusion and that the document referred to
speaks for itself.
7. Admit that on February 17, 1983, Walter P. Larson met with
James Hogle, and others, to extend time within which the conditions
contained in said Earnest Money Agreement must be satisfied.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 7 as

it is vague and ambiguous as to which conditions the plaintiffs are
referring.
8. Admit that James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle before March
11, 1983 interviewed and hired Jerry Christensen to be the manager
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
9.

Denied.

Admit that on August 31, 1982, Larson Ford SAles, Inc.,

Inc. filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.
ANSWER:
10.

Admitted.

Admit that on March 23, 1983, HBGH, Inc. was identified

in a first Amended Disclosure Statement, filed with the Bankruptcy
Court, as having been formed for the specific purpose of purchasing
the assets of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
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ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No, 10 in

that the document referred to speaks for itself.
11.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay agreed to

specific funding and financial backing of HBGH to facilitate and
properly fund the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 11 as

it is vague and ambiguous as to the specific funding being referred
to.
12.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle filed his personal financial

statement and resume along with the Disclosure Statement filed in
the Bankruptcy Court in the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. Bankruptcy.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 12 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
13.
Statement,

Admit that on April 21, 1983, the Amended Disclosure
filed

in

the

Larson

Ford

Sales,

Inc.

Bankruptcy

proceeding, was modified to disclose the investors and purchasers
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., as being Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay,
among others.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 13 in

that the document referred to speaks for itself.
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14. Admit that the anonymous investors, not identified in the
disclosure statement referred to in the preceding request, were
alleged

to

have

cash

reserves

available

in

an

amount

of

$500,000.00.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 14 as

being vague and ambiguous.
15.

Admit that on March 2, 1983, a finderfs fee agreement to

Wardley Corporation was signed by Dennis Gay, Stephen P. Bruno,
James Hogle, Jr., and Owen C Hogle.
ANSWER;
16.

Admitted.

Admit that on March 5, 1983, an escrow agreement was

signed by HBGH, Inc. and Walter P. Larson.
ANSWER:
17.

Admitted.

Admit that the letters in HBGH, Inc. stand for Hogle,

Bruno, Gay, and Hogle.
ANSWER:
18.

Denied.

Admit that on March 8, 1983, you paid the payroll of

Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
19.

Denied.

Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle

became an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Denied.
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20.

Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle, as

an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., re-hired all of Larson Ford
Sales' employees.
ANSWER;
21.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle established the office directly

opposite the office of Walter P. Larson at the dealership, and that
Owen C. Hogle directed the affairs of Larson Ford Sales from that
office.
ANSWER:
22.

Denied.

Admit Owen C. Hogle maintained the above office so that

he could monitor and protect his investment in Larson Ford Sales,
Inc.
ANSWER:
23.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle personally acknowledged to

Walter P. Larson that the operation of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. was
his [Owen C. Hogle1s] responsibility.
ANSWER:
24.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle directly represented to the

Plaintiffs that he was personally and financially responsible for
the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
25.

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to the Plaintiffs

that you would operate, fund, and manage Larson Ford Sales, Inc.

7
ANSWER:
26.

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to Plaintiffs that

you would

resolve problems concerning certain

loans made by

Commercial Security Bank, Citizen's Bank, and the Small Business
Administration made to Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
27.

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that

you would provide Ford Motor Credit Company with personal financial
statements and assume the guarantee contract under Ford Motor
Credit Company's ninety (90) day repurchase agreement with Walter
P. Larson and Larson Ford.
ANSWER:
28.

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that

you would cooperate and commit the financial resources as were
necessary under the confirmed bankruptcy plan to operate Larson
Ford Sales, Inc., Inc.
ANSWER:
29.

Denied.

Admit that pursuant to Utah State law, Owen C. Hogle, as

an owner of Larson Ford, provided, through his own insurance
company, an automobile dealer bond in order for Larson Ford to
operate as a dealer with the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 29 in

that it calls for a legal conclusion.
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30•

Admit that Owen C. Hogle, in his own handwriting, caused

memos to be written to Larson Ford employees defining procedures
to be followed, as well as penalties to be inflicted on employees
who failed to comply.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 3 0 as

being vague and ambiguous.
31.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle proceeded, as owner of Larson

Ford, to cause certain advertising slogans to be painted on the
showroom windows of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
32.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle obtained his own funds to pay

obligations of Larson Ford Sales as owner of Larson Ford Sales,
Inc.
ANSWER:
33.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle met in the Salt Lake office of

the Ford Motor Credit Company with Park Larson and Denny Anderson,
Ford Motor Credit Branch Manager, at which time Owen C. Hogle was
introduced by Park Larson to Mr. Anderson as the new owner of
Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
34.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle agreed to provide personal

financial statements to Ford Motor Credit with the intent for Hogle
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to assume the liability for new vehicle flooring for Larson Ford
to be provided by Ford Motor Credit Company.
ANSWER:

Denied.

35. Admit that Owen C. Hogle terminated all Larson Ford Sales
employees as soon as he took ownership control of Larson Ford
Sales, Inc. and that he then proceeded to interview and re-hire
those employees he wanted to retain.
ANSWER:
36.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle, as owner, and Jerry Christen-

sen, as Manager, met often in the Hogle Larson Ford office at which
time Hogle gave Christensen instructions and directions relating
to the operation and management of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;
37.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle gave specific verbal instruc-

tions to Larson Ford Sales lot boy employees that the lot boys were
to no longer run personal errands for Park Larson or his family and
not to go to Park's home in connection with personal favors for
Park Larson.
ANSWER:
38.

Admitted.

Admit you have personally advanced over $150,000 in

monies and nearly two months of time in the daily operations of
Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Denied.
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39.

Admit that since 1983 you were silent investors with

Steven Bruno or various real estate investments.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 39 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
40.

Admit that your attorney, Harold Stephens, in Compliant

No. 87-6053, claimed that the ostensible ownership of a closely
held corporation in the names of Dennis Gay, Kees Versteeg, Tony
Versteeg and Steve Bruno did not represent you and their hidden
equity interest in that closely held corporation.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 40 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
41.

Admit HBGH incorporated on March 22, without mentioning

you as participants.
ANSWER;
42.

Admitted.

Admit that you allowed Stephen Bruno and/or Dennis Gay

to represent that they acted in your name in purchasing the assets
and assuming the liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Denied.
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43.

Admit that during all or part of 1982 and 1983 Harold

Stephens represented you as your attorney.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 43 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
44.

Admit that in 1983 you hired and paid with your funds,

a CPA, D. Clark Brown, to represent you with the investigating and
purchasing of Larson Ford Sales.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 44 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
45.

Admit that you signed the March 2, 1983, Finder's Fee

Agreement a copy of which is attached hereto.
ANSWER:

Admitted.

DATED this J 0^day of January, 1991.
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

/Hfrry Caston
_ :torneys for Defendants
James and Owen Hogle

CASTON\HOGLOW01.ATR

HARRY CASTON (4009)
SHAWN D. TURNER (5813)
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr.
and Owen C. Hogle
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WALTER P. LARSON, SYBIL LARSON
and JOHN LARSON,
Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants ,

AMENDED ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS TO
DEFENDANTS JAMES HOGLE, JR.
AND OWEN C. HOGLE

vs.
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS W.
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al.

Civil No. C83-5542
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants and CounterClaimants .

Defendants, James Hogle Jr. and Owen C. Hogle, amend their
Answers to Plaintiffs1 First Set of Requests for Admissions to
Defendants James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle as follows:
1.

Admit that on January 15, 1983, James Hogle attended a

meeting with Dennis Gay, Steve Bruno, and Walter P. Larson.
ANSWER:
2.

Admitted.

Admit that during the January 15, 1983, meeting James

Hogle indicated that he was one of the wealthy individuals on whose
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behalf was signed the January 13, 1990 Earnest Money Agreement to
purchase the assets and liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;
3.

Denied.

Admit that in January or February, 1983 Walter P. Larson

gave a tour of the premises of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. to James
Hogle, Jr., Steven Brown, Owen C. Hogle and the Realtor from
Wardley Real Estate.
ANSWER:
4.

Admitted.

Admit

that

in January

1983 you were

interested in

purchasing Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;

Denied.

5. Admit that on January 13, 1983, an Earnest Money Offer was
made to Wardley Real Estate Company from Western Slope Development
which had been incorporated the day before to purchase Larson Ford
Sales, Inc. for a total purchase price of $150,000.00.
ANSWER;

Denied.

Defendants, James and Owen Hogle, have

reviewed the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase of January
13, 1983, but have no knowledge or information upon which to base
a belief as to whether Western Slope Development was incorporated
on January 12, 1983.
6.
preceding

Admit that the Earnest Money Offer, referred to in the
request,

contained

certain

contingencies,

to-wit;

approval by Ford Motor Company of the franchise transfer, pur-
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chasers1 inspection and approval of the property lease, assets of
the business, and inspection and approval of the findings of his
agent after inspection of the books and records of Larson Ford
Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 6 as

it calls for a legal conclusion and that the document referred to
speaks for itself.
7. Admit that on February 17, 1983, Walter P. Larson met with
James Hogle, and others, to extend time within which the conditions
contained in said Earnest Money Agreement must be satisfied.
ANSWER;

Denied.

James Hogle met with plaintiff, Walter P.

Larson, on one occasion.

That meeting took place at the dealer-

ship.
8. Admit that James Hogle, Jr. and Owen C. Hogle before March
11, 1983 interviewed and hired Jerry Christensen to be the manager
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;
9.

Denied.

Admit that on August 31, 1982, Larson Ford Sales, Inc.,

Inc. filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.
ANSWER;
10.

Admitted.

Admit that on March 23, 1983, HBGH, Inc. was identified

in a first Amended Disclosure Statement, filed with the Bankruptcy
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Court, as having been formed for the specific purpose of purchasing the assets of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 10 in

that the document referred to speaks for itself.
11.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay agreed to

specific funding and financial backing of HBGH to facilitate and
properly fund the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 11 as

it is vague and ambiguous as to the specific funding being referred
to.
12.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle filed his personal financial

statement and resume along with the Disclosure Statement filed in
the Bankruptcy Court in the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. bankruptcy.
ANSWER: Denied. Owen C. Hogle's personal financial statement
and resume were provided to Defendants Bruno and Gay and Ford Motor
Company.
13.
Statement,

Admit that on April 21, 1983, the Amended Disclosure
filed

in

the

Larson

Ford

Sales,

Inc. bankruptcy

proceeding, was modified to disclose the investors and purchasers
of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., as being Owen C. Hogle and Dennis Gay,
among others.
ANSWER: Denied. Defendants, James and Owen C. Hogle, are not
aware of any document which indicated that these defendants were
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the purchasers of Larson Ford. These defendants had agreed to fund
HBGH, which was contemplating the purchase of Larson Ford.
14. Admit that the anonymous investors, not identified in the
disclosure statement referred to in the preceding request, were
alleged

to

have

cash

reserves

available

in

an

amount

of

$500,000.00.
ANSWER;

Denied.

15. Admit that on March 2, 1983, a finder's fee agreement to
Wardley Corporation was signed by Dennis Gay, Stephen P. Bruno,
James Hogle, Jr., and Owen C. Hogle.
ANSWER;
16.

Admitted.

Admit that on March 5, 1983, an escrow agreement was

signed by HBGH, Inc. and Walter P. Larson.
ANSWER;
17.

Admitted.

Admit that the letters in HBGH, Inc. stand for Hogle,

Bruno, Gay, and Hogle.
ANSWER;
18.

Denied.

Admit that on March 8, 1983, you paid the payroll of

Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;
19.

Denied.

Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle

became an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;

Denied.
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20. Admit that on or about March 11, 1983, Owen C. Hogle, as
an owner of Larson Ford Sales, Inc., re-hired all of Larson Ford
Sales' employees.
ANSWER:

Denied.

21. Admit that Owen C. Hogle established the office directly
opposite the office of Walter P. Larson at the dealership, and that
Owen C. Hogle directed the affairs of Larson Ford Sales from that
office.
ANSWER:
22.

Denied.

Admit Owen C

Hogle maintained the above office so that

he could monitor and protect his investment in Larson Ford Sales,
Inc.
ANSWER:
23.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle personally acknowledged to

Walter P. Larson that the operation of Larson Ford Sales, Inc. was
his [Owen C. Hoglefs] responsibility.
ANSWER:
24.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C

Hogle directly represented to the

Plaintiffs that he was personally and financially responsible for
the purchase of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
25.

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to the Plaintiffs

that you would operate, fund, and manage Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
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ANSWER:
26.
you would

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to Plaintiffs that
resolve problems

concerning

certain

loans made by

Commercial Security Bank, Citizen's Bank, and the Small Business
Administration made to Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER;
27.

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that

you would provide Ford Motor Credit Company with personal financial
statements and assume the guarantee contract under Ford Motor
Credit Company's ninety (90) days repurchase agreement with Walter
P. Larson and Larson Ford.
ANSWER:
28.

Denied.

Admit that you directly represented to plaintiffs that

you would cooperate and commit the financial resources as were
necessary under the confirmed bankruptcy plan to operate Larson
Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Denied.

29. Admit that pursuant to Utah State law, Owen C. Hogle, as
an owner of Larson Ford, provided, through his own insurance
company, an automobile dealer bond in order for Larson Ford to
operate as a dealer with the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles.
ANSWER:

Denied.

Defendant Owen C. Hogle is not aware of any

documents in which he identified himself as owner of Larson Ford.
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30. Admit that Owen C. Hogle, in his own handwriting, caused
memos to be written to Larson Ford employees defining procedures
to be followed, as well as penalties to be inflicted on employees
who failed to comply.
ANSWER:

Denied.

Owen C. Hogle does recall writing a

memorandum to employees; however, he never defined procedures or
penalties.
31.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle proceeded, as owner of Larson

Ford, to cause certain advertising slogans to be painted on the
showroom windows of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
32.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle obtained his own funds to pay

obligations of Larson Ford Sales as owner of Larson Ford Sales,
Inc.
ANSWER:
33.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle met in the Salt Lake office of

the Ford Motor Credit Company with Park Larson and Denny Anderson,
Ford Motor Credit Branch Manager, at which time Owen C. Hogle was
introduced by Park Larson to Mr. Anderson as the new owner of
Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
34.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle agreed to provide personal

financial statements to Ford Motor Credit with the intent for Hogle
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to assume the liability for new vehicle flooring for Larson Ford
to be provided by Ford Motor Credit Company.
ANSWER;

Denied.

35. Admit that Owen C. Hogle terminated all Larson Ford Sales
employees as soon as he took ownership control of Larson Ford
Sales, Inc. and that he then proceeded to interview and re-hire
those employees he wanted to retain.
ANSWER:
36.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle, as owner, and Jerry Christen-

sen, as Manager, met often in the Hogle Larson Ford office at which
time Hogle gave Christensen instructions and directions relating
to the operation and management of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:
37.

Denied.

Admit that Owen C. Hogle gave specific verbal instruc-

tions to Larson Ford Sales lot boy employees that the lot boys were
to no longer run personal errands for Park Larson or his family and
not to go to Park's home in connection with personal favors for
Park Larson.
ANSWER:
38.

Admitted.

Admit you have personally advanced over $150,000 in

monies and nearly two months of time in the daily operations of
Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Denied.
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39.

Admit that since 1983 you were silent investors with

Steven Bruno or various real estate investments.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 39 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
40.

Admit that your attorney, Harold Stephens, in Complaint

No. 87-6053, claimed that the ostensible ownership of a closely
held corporation in the names of Dennis Gay, Kees Versteeg, Tony
Versteeg and Steve Bruno did not represent you and their hidden
equity interest in that closely held corporation.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 40 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
41.

Admit HBGH incorporated on March 22, without mentioning

you as participants.
ANSWER;
42.

Admitted.

Admit that you allowed Stephen Bruno and/or Dennis Gay

to represent that they acted in your name in purchasing the assets
and assuming the liabilities of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
ANSWER:

Denied.
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43.

Admit that during all or part of 1982 and 1983 Harold

Stephens represented you as your attorney.
ANSWER;

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 43 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
44.

Admit that in 1983 you hired and paid with your funds,

a CPA, D. Clark Brown, to represent you with the investigating and
purchasing of Larson Ford Sales.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to Request for Admission No. 44 as

it is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
45.

Admit that you signed the March 2, 1983, Finder1s Fee

Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto.
ANSWER:

Admitted.

DATED this r

day of November, 1991.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

BY.

L-g? - Z

Shawn D. Turner
Attorneys for Defendants
James and Owen C. Hogle
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